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I. INTRODUCTION
Catherine Stevens had built her retirement savings "a dollar at
a time over a lifetime of hard work" when it was "reduced to virtually
zero" at Enron's collapse.1 "I feel very strongly that we have all been
wronged," she said. Her plans for a secure future had been destroyed.2
Almost eight years after Enron's failure, stories like
Catherine's persist, and employee retirement income security remains
as comforting as an imaginary friend. A falling stock market in the
wake of financial finagling leaves many employee retirement plans
dangerously insecure. 3 Employees like Catherine who bet their futures
on their company's stock have seen some of the worst losses, 4 with
catastrophic results.5 Like imaginary friends, the reality of retirement
security becomes clearer with age and utterly disappointing. As we
grow up, we realize it doesn't exist.
In response to the financial finagling, many employees have
filed lawsuits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1. Declaration of Catherine Stevens in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification
6, at 2, In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., No. H 01-CV-3913 (S.D. Tex. June
7, 2006) [hereinafter Declaration of Catherine Stevens], available at
http://external.hbsslaw.com/Enron/courtdoc-en-cstevensdecl.pdf.
2. Id.
3. See Andrea Coombes, Retirements in Peril: US System Full of Holes, Dow JONES NEWS
SERVICE, Sept. 21, 2009, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/retirements-in-peril-us-
system-is-full-of-holes-2009-09-21 (arguing that the recent economic recovery has not reached
retirement savings, which lost "40% or more in the downturn"); Editorial, From Here to
Retirement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, at A22 ("So far, the cumulative wipe-out of household
retirement savings totals about $2 trillion, and no one believes that the downturn is anywhere
near over."); Robert Powell, Retirement-Plan Recovery Still Far Off, DOw JONES NEWS SERVICE,
Aug. 5, 2009, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/retirement-plan-recovery-stll-far-
off-2009-08-04 (citing a 16.4 percent decline in defined-contribution account holdings since 2007).
4. See Paul J. Lim, Don't Paint Nest Eggs in Company Colors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2008,
at BU5 (explaining the risk associated with investing in employer stock, but noting that "nearly
two of every five 401(k) participants" at the end of 2008 "were putting 20 percent of their money
or more into employer stock"); see also Employers Begin to Reinstate 401(k) Matches as Economy
Shows Signs of Improvement, MANAGING 401(K) PLANS, Jan. 2010 (reporting data that twenty-
seven percent of companies that had suspended matches said that they have reinstated their
matches, or plan to reinstate in 2010).
5. See Mark Gimein, Don't Count on Your 401(k), WASH. POST, May 17, 2009, at G01
("We're already witnessing the beginning of [this] catastrophe now....").
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1974 ("ERISA"). 6 According to legal and financial analysts, ERISA
"stock-drop" litigation is steadily on the rise.7 But the proliferation of
these lawsuits may be a cause for academic concern. ERISA law on its
own already provides a complex yet shaky foundation,8 and with the
inability of some plaintiffs to aggregate their claims, savings built "a
dollar at a time over a lifetime of hard work" may crumble without
recourse in the law. 9
Further complicating ERISA stock-drop litigation is the
overlapping and evolving relationship with claims under Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Rule 10b-5.10 One of the most
common claims in an ERISA stock-drop lawsuit is that the pension
plan's fiduciaries breached their duty of loyalty to plan participants by
either misrepresenting the value of company stock or failing to
disclose material information.' Because Rule 10b-5 lawsuits also
challenge communications affecting the value of corporate securities,
12
6. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(2006).
7. See Jerry Crimmins, Worker, Retiree Class Actions Surge: Report, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Jan. 29, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 22565321( "Class-action litigation over workplace
retirement plans surged in 2008 both in filings and settlements as workers struggled to recoup
401(k) losses .... ). Many legal scholars have also predicted that the Supreme Court's 2008
decision in LaRue v. DeWolf is likely to increase the number of stock-drop lawsuits brought as
class actions. See, e.g., Meredith Z. Maresca, ERISA Practitioner Says LaRue Will Give Rise to
Misrepresentation Claims in Lower Courts, 35 Pens. & Ben. Daily (BNA) 2305 (Oct. 7, 2008)
(noting likely "surge of litigation in lower federal courts" after LaRue); More Participant Claims
Expected in Wake of LaRue Rule, MANAGING 401(K) PLANS, Apr. 2008 (explaining that the LaRue
decision expands the scope of participants who may bring suit under ERISA section 502(a)(2)).
8. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (explaining that ERISA is "an
enormously complex and detailed statute that resolved innumerable disputes between powerful
competing interests-not all in favor of potential plaintiffs").
9. Declaration of Catherine Stevens, supra note 1.
10. See Mark Casciari & Ian Morrison, Should the Securities Exchange Act be the Sole
Federal Remedy for an ERISA Fiduciary Misrepresentation of the Value of Public Employer
Stock?, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 637, 637 (2006) (arguing that "ERISA does not provide an
additional remedy" for misrepresentations or nondisclosures); Craig C. Martin & Elizabeth L.
Fine, ERISA Stock Drop Cases: An Evolving Standard, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 889, 889-90,
912-18 (2005) (examining parallel and divergent factual bases and standards of liability under
each regime); Susan J. Stabile, I Believed My Employer and Didn't Sell My Company Stock: Is
There an ERISA (or '34 Act) Remedy For Me?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 385, 388-89, 423-24 (2004)
(investigating overlap of ERISA and securities laws and urging caution in allowing a cause of
action for behavior that arguably constitutes a violation of both).
11. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 510-15 (1996) (expanding the ERISA duty of
loyalty to include nondisclosure and misrepresentation claims).
12. SEC Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
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securities fraud and ERISA lawsuits often arise from the same
underlying facts. 13 Central to both of these claims is the security
holder's feeling that she has been "wronged" by the fraudulent or
otherwise dishonest conduct of the employer-defendant. 14 The 10b-5
and ERISA plaintiffs both allege financial loss in connection with
artificially inflated company stock and material omissions or
misstatements of corporate insiders. Both target the same accounting
errors, irregularities, or otherwise fishy corporate conduct and involve
an overlapping set of defendants. Even so, courts maintain that 10b-5
and ERISA lawsuits are two different causes of action, which must be
analyzed in different ways. 15
Driving this judicial determination are four key substantive
and procedural differences between lawsuits under Rule 10b-5 and
ERISA sections 409(a) and 502(a)(2). 16 First, most 10b-5 lawsuits are
governed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PSLRA"), which provides for an automatic discovery stay and
heightened pleading requirements. 7 Mirroring Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b), the PSLRA requires that 10b-5 claimants plead "loss
causation" and "state with particularity" facts creating a "cogent and
compelling inference" that the defendants acted with intent to
To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
13. Casciari & Morrison, supra note 10, at 637.
14. Declaration of Catherine Stevens, supra note 1.
15. See Rogers v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 521 F.3d 702, 704 (7th Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, C.J.)
"ERISA is a different statute, in a different title of the United States Code. Plaintiffs seek to use
ERISA to recover for events that as a result of PSLRA could not support an action on behalf of
shareholders at large."). Despite clear indications that courts will continue, in practice, to
recognize ERISA misrepresentation and nondisclosure claims, many scholars argue that ERISA
should not provide a separate remedy to the extent that it overlaps and even conflicts with
securities laws. See, e.g., Casciari & Morrison, supra note 10, at 637 ("[Flor misrepresentation
claims . . . the exclusive and appropriate federal remedy . . .should be the one provided by
Congress under the federal Securities Exchange Act. In attempting to assert such claims under
ERISA, the plaintiffs' bar is simply attempting to extract duplicative recovery and attorneys'
fees, to the ultimate detriment of plan participants."). While this may inform the analysis of the
scope of ERISA fiduciary duties, I recognize here only that ERISA misrepresentation claims
exist. I will not attempt to argue whether they should exist.
16. For a more comprehensive overview of the substantive and procedural differences
between ERISA stock-drop suits and securities law claims, see Clovis Trevino Bravo, ERISA
Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure Claims: Securities Litigation under the Guise of ERISA?,
26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 497, 501-27 (2009).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1), (2), (3)(B) (2006).
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deceive.18 ERISA claims, however, are not covered by PSLRA, and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 is the sole guidance for discovery. 19
Without the additional requirements of PLSRA and Rule 9(b), ERISA
plaintiffs need only plead facts creating a "plausible" inference of
causal connection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a), 20
making it easier to survive a motion to dismiss. Second, Rule 10b-5
plaintiffs must show that the defendants acted with scienter, which is
a wrongful state of mind requiring at least a showing of recklessness, 2'
while ERISA requires only a showing of negligence. 22 Third, Rule 10b-
5 only allows for the recovery of damages as defined by the loss
resulting from the defendant's misstatements. 23 Remedies under
ERISA, however, may exceed the plaintiffs' damages, including lost
profits and other equitable relief restoring the benefit plan for losses. 24
Finally, Rule 10b-5 defendants are defined broadly by their
relationship to any fraudulent misstatements, 25  while ERISA
defendants must be plan fiduciaries.26 This means that targeted
communications in an ERISA suit are limited to those made by plan
fiduciaries in connection with the benefit plan itself. 27  Plan
documents, however, often incorporate by reference SEC filings, and
plan fiduciaries are often corporate insiders. Thus, defendants in Rule
18. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1), (2), (4) (2006) (providing that a complaint must "state
with particularity" all facts establishing the misleading statements and omissions and required
state of mind), and Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323-24 (2007)
("Congress did not merely require plaintiffs to 'provide a factual basis for their allegations,' i.e.,
to allege facts from which an inference of scienter rationally could be drawn. Instead, Congress
required plaintiffs to plead with particularity facts that give rise to a "strong"-i.e., a powerful or
cogent-inference."), with FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state
with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.").
19. Rogers, 521 F.3d at 704.
20. In re Dynergy Inc. ERISA Litig., 309 F. Supp. 2d 861, 867 (S.D. Tex. 2004) ("ERISA does
not have heightened pleading requirements."); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA
Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 625 (S.D. Tex. 2003) ("ERISA does not even have heightened
pleading requirements, but it is subject to ... notice pleading."); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (confirming the Twombly plausibility standard for FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)).
21. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
22. James v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 305 F.3d 439, 449, 452 (6th Cir. 2002).
23. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) (providing
that damages for violations of section 10b-5 are to be measured by the difference between the
value of what the seller received for the shares and the fair market value of the shares at the
time of the sale).
24. ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2006).
25. See SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010) ('It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly ... .
26. ERISA § 409(a).
27. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 500 (1996) (specifying that fiduciary status is a
necessary element for an ERISA claim).
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10b-5 and ERISA misrepresentation lawsuits frequently intersect,
even if only incidentally. 28
In spite of these differences-and also because of them-
apparent similarities between 10b-5 and ERISA lawsuits create fertile
ground for inconsistent standards. Because ERISA stock-drop law is
alarmingly underdeveloped, it is tempting for both plaintiffs and
defendants to import old-as-dirt securities law principles into the
ERISA context. 29 Surprisingly, neither the parties nor the courts give
an adequate rationale as to why these principles are transferable,
resulting in disparate judicial opinions, disjointed laws, and uncertain
grounds for high-stake settlement negotiations.30
The most vivid example of uncertainty in the ERISA stock-drop
context is the reliance element for misrepresentation and
nondisclosure claims. 31 In securities law, detrimental reliance provides
the requisite causal connection between the defendant's fraudulent
misstatement and the plaintiffs financial loss. 3 2 Proving individual
reliance, however, precludes class certification under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3), which require that common issues
predominate over the individual ones. 33 In fraud-on-the-market cases,
10b-5 classes are only certified under the Basic v. Levinson
presumption of reliance, which stems from the theory of efficient
capital markets. 34 Courts have not uniformly applied the same
presumption, however, in ERISA section 502(a)(2) cases, even though
the reliance element likewise provides a causal nexus and requires
28. See infra Part III.1 and accompanying notes.
29. See Bravo, supra note 16, at 498 (concluding that "the substantial overlap and potential
conflict between the two actions warrants substantive clarification and procedural
harmonization to prevent plaintiffs' lawyers from using ERISA to evade the protections that the
federal securities laws provide against abusive litigation").
30. These settlements can be costly. See, e.g., Court Gives Final OK to $70.5M Settlement
Ending ERISA Stock-Drop Claims Against Tyco, MANAGING 401(K) PLANS, Jan. 2010 (noting a
$70.5 million settlement after seven years of litigation).
31. See Jones v. NovaStar Fin., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 181, 190 (W.D. Mo. 2009) ('The question on
whether plaintiffs must individually show reliance on [section] 502(a)(2) communications
claims-and, thus, whether class treatment is appropriate-has not been settled by the courts.").
32. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988) ("Reliance provides the requisite causal
connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiffs injury.").
33. Id. at 242 ("Requiring proof of individualized reliance from each member of the proposed
plaintiff class effectively would have prevented respondents from proceeding with a class action,
since individual issues then would have overwhelmed the common ones."). This aspect of Rule
23(b)(3) is often called "the predominance requirement." See, e.g., Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP,
No. 09-4475, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 17090, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 16, 2010) (noting "predominance
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)").
34. Id. at 243-44, 248-50; see, e.g., Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42
(2005) (noting basic elements of action under lOb-5).
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individualized proof. Rather, for ERISA stock-drop claims there are at
least four ways in which courts treat this detrimental reliance
element, breaking down into two analytically distinct questions:
(1) does ERISA section 502(a)(2) require a showing of eyeball reliance,
and, if so, (2) does this affect class certification? Because of the stakes
involved, plaintiffs in ERISA cases have pushed courts to answer "no"
to the first question and avoid the issue of class certification
altogether. 35 Although courts that have adopted this rule usually
certify classes under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), it is difficult to explain
how this view accounts for the but-for causation element of ERISA
section 502(a)(2) claims. 36
The second view is to accept the eyeball reliance requirement
as an element of ERISA section 502(a)(2) claims but to certify the class
of plaintiffs anyway. 37 These courts reject the presumption of reliance
from Basic v. Levinson, but for some reason do not find reliance to
preclude class certification. Because such individual reliance would
preclude certifying a class of 10b-5 plaintiffs, however, this approach
requires an account of why ERISA claims are different. No court has
yet supplied this analysis.
The third approach is to treat ERISA claims exactly like 10b-5
claims and to certify classes under the Basic v. Levinson framework.
While some plaintiffs have succeeded in getting courts to adopt this
framework, courts have done so without articulating their rationale. 38
The problem is that ERISA section 502(a)(2) cases are not securities
10b-5 claims,3 9 and it is not clear that this analysis should apply.
Finally, at least six courts have rejected the Basic v. Levinson
presumption and, finding reliance to be an element of a section
35. See, e.g., Brieger v. Tellabs, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 345, 353-54 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (certifying the
class, finding that "[t]he Seventh Circuit has never expressly held that detrimental reliance is an
element of an ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claim").
36. See infra Part III.A.3 (explaining the causation element for ERISA misrepresentation
claims).
37. See, e.g., George v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 338, 348 (N.D. Ill. 2008) ("[T]he
issue of individual detrimental reliance is irrelevant to class certification in an ERISA action
under Section 502(a)(2) or (3).').
38. See, e.g., In re Cardinal Health ERISA Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1046 (S.D. Ohio
2006) (disposing reliance question by deferring determination on sufficiency until after
discovery); In re Tyco Int'l, Ltd., MDL No.02-1335-PB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58278, at *23-28
(D.N.H. Aug. 15, 2006) (importing concepts of reliance from the securities fraud context where
"[d]efendants have not cited, and [the court has] not located, a decision" refusing to apply such
concepts in ERISA litigation); In re AEP ERISA Litig., 327 F. Supp. 2d 812, 833 (S.D. Ohio 2004)
(finding sufficient reliance in plain articulation of presumption in pleadings).
39. Rogers v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 521 F.3d 702, 704 (7th Cir. 2008) ("ERISA is a different
statute, in a different title of the United States Code.").
307
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
502(a)(2) claim, refused to certify the class of plaintiffs on the
misrepresentation claim.40 This framework, however, effectively
eliminates the possibility of aggregating misrepresentation claims
under section 502(a)(2), which, like 10b-5 claims, provide little
individual incentive to bring suit. Plaintiffs who cannot aggregate
their claims may be left without a remedy, which is the problem that
Basic v. Levinson was meant to solve.
Considering these four different approaches to the ERISA
reliance element, the purpose of this Note is to resolve the insecurity
plaguing class certification and to propose a new causal analysis for
these claims. Part II traces the evolving standard of ERISA
misrepresentation claims, the principles and policies that guide these
claims, and the standard for class certification. Part III evaluates the
existing status of the ERISA reliance element and its disparate
treatment at class certification. It then compares the nature of
reliance in both the securities fraud and ERISA contexts. Because
investor decisions are heavily context dependent, and retirement plan
participants are limited both by the number of options available to
them and the dynamics of the employer-employee relationship, plan
participants' claims under ERISA are sufficiently distinct from 10b-5
claims to require a different reliance standard for class certification.
Part IV articulates that standard. Rather than the 10b-5
requirement of individual reliance by every class member, this Note
proposes a scheme of "overall reliance" in the case of ERISA
misrepresentation claims. This standard requires a showing of
detrimental reliance by some as opposed to all class members, focusing
on the harm to the employee benefit plan as a whole rather than harm
to the individual accounts.
Part V concludes that ERISA misrepresentation and
nondisclosure claims should be evaluated with rigor given the high
stakes of the litigation for both parties. Even though retirement
security may seem at times to be illusory, the legal standard for
ERISA class certification need not be uncertain.
40. Tibble v. Edison Int'l, No. CV 07-5359 SVW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120939, at *10-13
(C.D. Cal., June 30, 2009); In re Merck & Co., MDL No. 1658 (SRC), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10243, at *15-21 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2009); In re RadioShack ERISA Litig., 547 F. Supp. 2d 606, 616
(N.D. Tex. 2008); In re Schering-Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., No. 03-1204, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
89718, at *34-37 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2008); Lively v. Dynegy, Inc., No. 05-cv-00063-MJR, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14794, at *55-56 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2007); In re Elec. Data Sys. Corp. ERISA
Litig., 224 F.R.D. 613, 630 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
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II. THE POLICIES OF ERISA AND THE CLASS CERTIFICATION STANDARD
Most ERISA stock-drop cases follow a single, well-defined path
to settlement or trial.41 After a negative financial forecast and a drop
in company stock price, participants and beneficiaries of the employer-
sponsored defined-contribution retirement plan often lose substantial
value in their accounts. These participants react by filing an ERISA
suit, claiming that the company's previous stock price was bolstered
by deceptive accounting practices or other misleading statements or
omissions. The plaintiffs claim that the recent drop in stock price was
a result of the market's learning of the inflated nature of previous
stock prices. 42
The crux of the ERISA claim is that the fiduciaries of the
employer-sponsored plan breached their duties to the plan and its
participants by allowing them to invest in the company's stock at the
artificially inflated price.43 In addition, the plaintiffs usually allege
that plan fiduciaries misrepresented or failed to disclose material
information affecting the value of the company's stock. 44 These
challenged communications sometimes include the company's
mandatory SEC filings, incorporated by reference into the Summary
Plan Description ("SPD")45 and other fiduciary disclosures. In sum,
41. See Deborah S. Davidson & Julia Y. Trankiem, Employer "Stock Drop" Litigation Under
ERISA 1-2 (Nov. 17, 2009) (paper presented at ABA Joint Committee on Employee Benefits 19th
Annual National Institute on ERISA Litigation, Chicago, Ill.), available at http://new.
abanet.org/calendar/19th- Annual- National- Institute- on- ERISA -LitigationMeeting
Materials/I Stock Drop Paper.pdf (explaining "the basic allegations of an ERISA stock drop
lawsuit" based on the 200 that have been filed largely in the last five to six years).
42. See, e.g., Consolidated Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act 569, In re Delphi Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 458
F. Supp. 2d 455 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (MDL No. 1725) ("The Director Defendants breached their
duty to inform and disclose by failing to provide to the other fiduciaries of the Plan complete and
accurate information regarding the true financial condition of the company and the risks of
investing Delphi stock, when they knew, as described above, that the Company was engaging in
accounting irregularities which artificially inflated the value of Delphi stock and rendered the
stock an unsuitable retirement investment for the Plan.").
43. This is often called the "prudence claim." See Davidson & Trankiem, supra note 41
(identifying the "prudence claim" as one of two substantive claims that the basic allegations of a
stock-drop lawsuit usually comprise).
44. This is often called the "misrepresentation/omission claim." See Davidson & Trankiem,
supra note 41 (identifying the "misrepresentation/omission claim" as one of two substantive
claims that the basic allegations of a stock-drop lawsuit usually comprise).
45. See ERISA § 102(a), 29 U.S.C. § 102 2 (a) (2006) ("A summary plan description of any
employee benefit plan shall be furnished to participants and beneficiaries as provided in section
1024(b) of this title. The summary plan description shall include the information described in
subsection (b), shall be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1:301
plaintiffs allege the three elements of an ERISA claim under sections
409(a) and 502(a)(2): that the defendants, (1) acting as fiduciaries,
(2) breached one or more of the fiduciary duties outlined in section
404(a), and that (3) this breach caused harm to the plan.46
Of these three elements of an ERISA stock-drop claim,
causation has proven the most problematic to define and prove.
Because defined-contribution accounts allow participants to choose
whether to invest in employer stock, 47 plaintiffs allege that they were
fraudulently induced to pick company equities through faulty
information.48 Therefore, just as in securities law, this "detrimental
reliance" element often acts as the but-for causal nexus between the
fiduciary's breach of duty and the harm to the defined-contribution
plan, satisfying the causation element of ERISA section 502(a)(2).
Courts have had trouble, however, coming up with a consistent
standard for testing whether the ERISA plaintiff meets the
detrimental reliance standard, or whether such a standard exists at
all.49 Scholars have also ignored this question, focusing instead on the
disclosure duties of ERISA fiduciaries and the scope of fiduciary duties
at the pleading stage.50 Given the impact that the detrimental reliance
participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such
participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan.").
46. See In re Computer Scis. Corp. ERISA Litig., 635 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1143 (C.D. Cal.
2009) (providing that plaintiffs must show that "there was a fiduciary breach and that but for the
breach, the [pilan's assets would have been greater").
47. See ERISA § 3(34) ("The term 'individual account plan' or 'defined-contribution plan'
means a pension plan which provides for an individual account for each participant and for
benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the participant's account, and any income,
expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be
allocated to such participant's account.").
48. See Davidson & Trankiem, supra note 41 (identifying fiduciaries' misleading of
participants through deceptive company communications as a theme of stock-drop lawsuit
allegations).
49. See Jones v. NovaStar Fin., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 181, 190 (W.D. Mo. 2009) (collecting cases)
('The question of whether plaintiffs must individually show reliance on [section] 502(a)(2)
communications claims-and, thus, whether class treatment is appropriate-has not been
settled by the courts.").
50. See, e.g., Craig C. Martin & Elizabeth L. Fine, ERISA Stock Drop Cases: An Evolving
Standard, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 889, 889-90 (comparing standards of liability for securities
fraud and ERISA stock-drop litigation, and discussing the implications of the differences
between the two) (2005); Craig C. Martin, Matthew J. Renaud & Omar R. Akbar, What's Up on
Stock-Drops? Moench Revisited, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 605, 606 (2006) ('This article addresses
the confusion regarding fiduciary duties engendered by ERISA stock-drop litigation .... ");
Stabile, supra note 10, at 388 (addressing whether "current ERISA case law allow for a claim of
breach of fiduciary duty based on misrepresentations and nondisclosures concerning the value of
a company and the prospects of its stock").
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element has on class certification, the inconsistent treatment of that
element in ERISA misrepresentation claims is particularly troubling.
Detrimental reliance is difficult to prove on an individual basis.
Because individual ERISA plaintiffs might have subjectively relied on
any number of statements, including employer meetings, e-mails,
newsletters, plan documents, or incorporated SEC filings, the reliance
element might not be susceptible to aggregate proof, making it
difficult to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3), and in some circuits,
even under Rule 23(a). 51
The significance of this issue is amplified by the fact that the
class certification stage is a pivotal-even determinative-moment in
the litigation of ERISA stock-drop claims. If plaintiffs cannot certify
the class, it is effectively the end of the litigation. Many of the
claimants will not seek relief on their own because they cannot afford
to litigate as individuals and lack incentive to litigate as employees of
the defendant. 52 For defendants, the determination is equally pivotal.
Defendants facing a class action lawsuit have great pressure to settle
because of the high variance associated with a single, aggregate
verdict. 53 Class certification creates great risks for the rare defendant
51. See, e.g., Brieger v. Tellabs, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 345, 353-354 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (explaining
that information was disseminated "through 'town hall' meetings, internal blast e-mail updates,
and newsletters"); Declaration of Gary Scott Dreadin in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification at 2, Tittle v. Enron Corp., No. H-01-9313, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68578 (S.D. Tex.
Aug. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Declaration of Gary Scott Dreadin], available at
http://external.hbsslaw.com/Enron/courtdoc-en-dreadindecl.pdf ("Enron management also used
the Company's internal email network to assure the employees concerning the financial health of
the company.").
52. See U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402-03 (1980) ('The justifications
that led to the development of the class action include . . . the facilitation of the spreading of
litigation costs among numerous litigants with similar claims.") (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 23
advisory committee's notes); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980)
("Where it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a
multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any
effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device."); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) ("Class actions also may permit the plaintiffs to pool claims
which would be uneconomical to litigate individually. . . . [Tihis lawsuit involves claims
averaging about $100 per plaintiff; most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic day in court if a
class action were not available.").
53. The "high variance" associated with class-action litigation stems from the possibility of
having one enormous, aggregate verdict, as opposed to seeing losses spread out across multiple
courts in multiple jurisdictions. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir.
1995) (Posner, J.) (noting the concern "with forcing the[ ] defendants to stake their companies on
the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if
they have no legal liability"). Under Posner's theory, defendants would rather settle than risk
bankruptcy from that large, aggregate verdict, no matter how small the chance of the verdict is.
Id. As some scholars have noted, however, whether this "settlement pressure" is a bad thing is
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who wants to take her case all the way to trial. 54 And even for the
defendants who wish to settle immediately, certification is essential
for precluding future claims against them on a global, class-wide
scale. 55 These factors raise the stakes for all parties involved in ERISA
misrepresentation claims and put the reliance determination at center
stage.
Despite the significance of the reliance determination, courts
have largely erred in their analysis of this element, either by deciding
that no such element exists, by drawing too strong an analogy to Rule
10b-5 claims, or by creating distinctions from 10b-5 claims where none
should logically exist. The following Subpart discusses the particular
standards for ERISA claims and the existing framework for class
certification in order to set a foundation for evaluating these disparate
judicial approaches in Part III.
A. The Policies and Elements of an ERISA Misrepresentation Claim
The standards for ERISA litigation are rooted in principles
unique to the structure and purposes of employee benefit plans.
Congress enacted ERISA to provide "minimum standards ... assuring
the equitable character" and "financial soundness" of retirement
benefit plans. 56 ERISA imposes on plan fiduciaries a standard of
conduct that is "the highest known to the law,"57 and courts typically
interpret this language broadly. 58
Under ERISA section 404(a), pension plan fiduciaries have four
enumerated duties. 59 First, fiduciaries must act loyally, that is, "solely
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries," and "for the
exclusive purpose" of "providing [them] benefits."60 Fiduciaries must
still up for debate, and may depend on why the variance exists. RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, THE LAW
OF CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE LITIGATION 61-63 (2009).
54. See NAGAREDA, supra note 53 (highlighting the risks of a single, aggregate verdict).
55. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884 (2008) (listing class actions as a mechanism for
precluding future claims).
56. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006).
57. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (1959)). See also Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1453 (6th Cir.
1988) ("Such a result would clearly contravene ERISA's imposition of a fiduciary duty that has
been characterized as 'the highest known to law.' ") (quoting Sommers Drug Stores Co. Emp.
Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1468 (5th Cir. 1986)).
58. See, e.g., Brown v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., Inc., 586 F.3d 1079, 1086 (8th Cir. 2009)
("ERISA is remedial legislation and should be liberally construed .... ") (citing Starr v. Metro
Sys., Inc., 461 F.3d 1036, 1040 (8th Cir. 2006)).
59. ERISA § 404(a).
60. Id. § 404(a)(1)(A).
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also act with prudence, discharging their duties with the same "care,
skill, prudence, and diligence" that a prudent man would use in like
circumstances. 61 In addition to their duties of loyalty and prudence,
fiduciaries must act "in accordance with the documents and
instruments governing the plan," which includes making required
disclosures. 62 Finally, for fixed, defined benefit plans in which
participants do not choose their investments, fiduciaries must
"diversify[] the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of
large losses." 63
Even though ERISA is a "comprehensive and reticulated
statute," the Supreme Court has held that these enumerated duties
are to be informed and even amplified by the common law of trusts.
64
In Varity Corp. v. Howe, the Court recognized that trust law principles
ought to inform ERISA law to the extent that trust law accords with
the special nature and purposes of employee benefit plans. 65 Although
these purposes can often be conflicting, the goal of protecting employee
benefits and the policy of encouraging employers to retain welfare
benefit plans in the first place will often inform the ERISA analysis. 6
6
Because ERISA does not require employers to sponsor benefit plans,
67
an overly burdensome scheme would likely discourage their existence,
even though "they have become an important factor affecting the
stability of employment and the successful development of industrial
relations."68 In fact, the legislative history of ERISA suggests that
"increas[ing] the number of individuals participating in retirement
plans" is a primary goal of the ERISA regulatory scheme.6
9
61. Id. § 404(a)(1)(B).
62. Id. § 404(a)(1)(D).
63. Id. § 404(a)(1)(C). This diversification requirement does not apply to the holding of
employer stock in eligible individual account plans (EIAPs), or defined-contribution accounts,
which are the subject of misrepresentation suits. Id. § 404(a)(2).
64. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251-52 (1993) (explaining the high standards
for fiduciaries under ERISA and its remedial and "comprehensive" aims).
65. 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996).
66. Id. (finding that courts may consider "Congress' desire to offer employees enhanced
protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and, on the other, its desire not to create a system
that is so complex that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers
from offering welfare benefit plans in the first place").
67. See ERISA § 4 (defining the scope of employer-sponsored benefits to which ERISA
applies, but not requiring employers to sponsor such plans).
68. Id. § 2(a).
69. S. REP. No. 93-383, at 1069 (1973) ("At the same time, the committee recognized that
private retirement plans are voluntary on the part of the employer, and, therefore, it has
carefully weighed the additional costs to the employer and minimized them to the extent
consistent with minimum standards for retirement benefits."); see also H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at
2348-49 (1973) (identifying as a goal of ERISA the promotion of "a renewed expansion of private
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Another basic principle guiding ERISA stock-drop litigation is
the representative nature of ERISA stock-drop claims, which are
brought by the plan participants and beneficiaries on behalf of the
retirement benefit plan itself.70 ERISA section 409(a) establishes a
fiduciary's personal liability for losses "to [the] plan" resulting from a
fiduciary's breach of duty, including any of the plan's lost profits. 71
ERISA section 502(a) creates a private right of action for losses and
identifies the types of civil actions that may be brought in response to
a fiduciary's breach of duty.7 2 Most ERISA stock-drop claims are
brought under ERISA section 502(a)(2),73 which authorizes the
Secretary of Labor, as well as plan participants, beneficiaries, and
fiduciaries, to bring actions on behalf of the plan for the obligations
defined in section 409(a). 74 Thus, the remedy sought is for the
employee benefit plan to restore to the plan all losses caused by the
fiduciary breach.7 5
The Supreme Court's decisions in Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Russell7 6 and LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates77
explain this representative nature of claims under ERISA section
502(a)(2). In Russell, the plaintiff received all benefits to which she
was contractually entitled but sought consequential damages under
ERISA section 502(a)(2) for a delay in processing her claim.78 In
holding that section 502(a)(2) did not provide a remedy for this type of
injury, the Russell court stressed that the text of section 409(a)
characterizes the relevant fiduciary relationship as one "with respect
to a plan," and repeatedly identified "the plan" as the victim of any
fiduciary breach and the recipient of any relief.79
retirement plans and increase [in] the number of participants receiving private retirement
benefits").
70. See infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
71. ERISA § 409(a) ("Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan ...shall be
personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each [fiduciary]
breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through
the use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary .....
72. Id. § 502(a).
73. Davidson & Trankiem, supra note 41, at 30.
74. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 253 (2008).
75. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985) (finding that the
representative nature of a section 502(a)(2) claim is "supported by the text of [section] 409, by the
statutory provisions defining the duties of a fiduciary, and by the provisions defining the rights
of a beneficiary").
76. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
77. 552 U.S. 248 (2008).
78. Russell, 473 U.S. at 136-37.
79. Id. at 140-42.
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In LaRue, the defendants used the "entire plan" language from
Russell as a shield, arguing that the plaintiffs did not have standing
under ERISA unless they sought a remedy for all plan participants.
80
The LaRue Court held, however, that individual account holders could
seek relief under ERISA section 502(a)(2) so long as they were not
seeking individualized relief, but relief to their accounts through the
plan.81 The Court distinguished between an individualized injury and
standing for an individual account holder: plaintiffs may not seek
damages for individual injuries under ERISA section 502(a)(2), but
they may seek recovery for losses to their individual accounts to the
extent that such losses result from injuries to plan assets which are
allocated to those individual accounts.8 2 In LaRue, the Court relied
heavily on ERISA's legislative history, revealing that " 'the crucible of
congressional concern was misuse and mismanagement of plan assets
by plan administrators.' "183 Because sections 502(a)(2) and 409 protect
"the financial integrity of the plan," the relevant injury that plaintiffs
assert in an ERISA stock-drop claim is that of the employer-sponsored
benefit plan through the losses to the individual accounts.
8 4
B. Class Certification as an Efficient Mechanism for Common Claims
Also relevant to ERISA misrepresentation and nondisclosure
suits is the standard for class certification. Given the plan-wide nature
of the section 502(a)(2) remedy and the wide-reaching effects of plan
mismanagement, most ERISA stock-drop claims proceed as class
actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Economic evidence
suggests a growing relationship between class certification and
settlement,8 5 making this an important stage for both parties as they
determine whether and how to proceed towards trial.
8 6
80. LaRue, 552 U.S. at 256.
81. Id. (finding that section 502(a)(2) does not provide a remedy for individual injuries
distinct from plan injuries).
82. Id.; see also id. at 262 (Thomas, J., concurring) ('The allocation of a plan's assets to
individual accounts for bookkeeping purposes does not change the fact that all the assets in the
plan remain plan assets."); Tullis v. UMB Bank, 515 F.3d 673, 680 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that
any assets recovered from the defendant under section 502(a)(2) "would first be paid into the
plan, then allocated to [the plaintiffs'] individual accounts").
83. LaRue, 552 U.S. at 254 (quoting Russell, 473 U.S. at 140 n.8).
84. Id.
85. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 730 (noting that the PSLRA was an attempt to curb "the abuse of the discovery process to
impose costs so burdensome that it is often economical for the victimized party to settle");
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J.
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The principal purpose of class certification is to achieve
efficiency and economy of litigation with respect to the parties and the
courts.87 Because individual litigants often do not have the resources
and economic incentive to pursue certain claims on their own,88
"[c]lass relief is 'peculiarly appropriate' when the 'issues involved are
common to the class as a whole' and when they 'turn on questions of
law applicable in the same manner to each member of the class.' "89 In
this sense, the class action device is a way of increasing access to the
courts and delegating regulatory functions to private individuals by
providing a collective incentive to sue.90
Even so, class certification is an "exception to the usual rule
that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named
parties only" and raises serious concerns about the due process rights
of the parties involved, particularly the absent class members.9 1
Because of this, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide strict
guidelines for class certification, ensuring that the named plaintiffs
will be adequately represented and the claims are generally
susceptible to aggregate proof. To certify a class, the district court
must find that the plaintiffs meet all of the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)
and that certification is appropriate under one of the three subsections
of Rule 23(b). 92
LEGAL STUD. 399, 418 (1973) (stating that an increase in the parties' costs of litigation relative to
their settlement costs will reduce the likelihood of litigation).
86. See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 97, 99 (2009) ("With vanishingly rare exception, class certification sets the litigation on a
path toward resolution by way of settlement . . . .In terms of their real-world impact, class
settlements can be quite significant, potentially involving dollar sums in the hundreds of
millions or requiring substantial restructuring of the defendant's operations.").
87. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155, 159 (1982); 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, ALBA
CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:6 (4th ed. 2010) [hereinafter
NEWBERG] (explaining the objectives of the class-action device).
88. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
89. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 155 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979)).
90. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) ('The aggregation of
individual claims in the context of a classwide [sic] suit is an evolutionary response to the
existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government."); Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) ("As commentators have noted, from the plaintiffs' point
of view a class action resembles a 'quasi-administrative proceeding, conducted by the judge.' ").
91. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884 (2008) (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40
(1940)) ("It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not
bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to
which he has not been made a party by service of process.").
92. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)-(b) (outlining the prerequisites and requirements for class
certification).
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) provides four
prerequisites for class certification: numerosity, 93 commonality,
94
typicality,95 and adequacy of representation. 96 Although the Supreme
Court has found that the commonality and typicality prerequisites
"tend to merge," the requirements are slightly different in their
analytical scope.97 Commonality looks to legal and factual questions
among the class members to determine whether the class is
sufficiently cohesive to bring its claims together.98 Courts agree that
this "commonality" prerequisite is "not demanding"-the proposed
class members need only share one question of fact or law in common
in order to meet the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement, so long
as the question moves the litigation forward. 99
Typicality, however, looks to the relationship between the
named plaintiff and the absent class members to "determine[] whether
a sufficient relationship exists between the injury to the named
plaintiff and the conduct affecting the class, so that the court may
properly attribute a collective nature to the challenged conduct."100 In
Sprague v. General Motors, the Sixth Circuit gave the following
summary of the "premise" of the typicality requirement: "[A]s goes the
claim of the named plaintiff, so go the claims of the class."10'
Also tending to merge with the commonality and typicality
requirements of Rule 23(a) is the adequacy of representation
prerequisite.10 2 Looking to the incentives of both the named plaintiffs
and class counsel, this requirement calls the court to evaluate
adequacy through conflicts of interest to ensure vigorous and "fair"
93. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) ("IT'he class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable."). Numerosity is not typically challenged in ERISA stock-drop cases, as there are
usually several plaintiffs scattered across the nation challenging the defendant's conduct.
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) ("[T]here are questions of law or fact common to the class.").
95. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(3) ("mhe claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class.").
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) ("[Tihe representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.").
97. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.13 (1982).
98. NEWBERG, supra note 87, § 3:10; see also RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, THE LAW OF CLASS
ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE LITIGATION 73-75 (2009) (describing the commonality and
typicality analysis in Falcon and explaining "minimal commonality").
99. NEWBERG, supra note 87, § 3:10; see also NAGAREDA, supra note 98, 73-75 (2009).
100. NEWBERG, supra note 87, § 3:13.
101. 133 F.3d 388, 399 (6th Cir. 1998).
102. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 158 n.13 (explaining that both commonality and typicality serve as
guideposts for assuring that "the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class
members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence").
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litigation. 10 3 The requirements "tend to merge," because, when a
proposed class fails on typicality, the named plaintiff will not have the
incentive to present evidence for claims other than his own. In the
context of detrimental reliance, some circuits have found this
determinative' 04--if each plaintiff must prove reliance individually,
the named plaintiff will not have the incentive to prove the absent
class members' reliance, and the named plaintiffs' reliance will not
push the litigation forward.
Together with numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation, a party seeking class certification must
also satisfy one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b), which also
serves to ensure that class certification is efficient and fair to all
parties involved. 10 5 Rules 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) provide for "mandatory"
classes with no ability to opt out. Traditionally, courts will certify
classes under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) when the plaintiffs seek injunctive
or equitable relief or relief with respect to a limited fund.10 6 Plaintiffs
in this case are already "tied together" as a class by outside
circumstances. 10 7 Rule 23(b)(1)(B), for example, applies to claims
against trusts and other entities with limited assets and multiple
potential claimants. 10 8 In that sense, Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is like a mass-
scale version of joinder under Rule 19-since deciding for some parties
would be dispositive of the rights of other parties, it is best to decide
all of the claims together. Rules 23(b)(1)(A) and 23(b)(2) likewise focus
on a common res or action. These rules apply in the case of injunctive
relief, where multiple rulings risk subjecting the defendant to
inconsistent standards. 10 9 For example, in a civil rights claim brought
by multiple plaintiffs, some courts may grant injunctive relief and
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Sprague, 133 F.3d at 399.
105. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
106. NEWBERG, supra note 87, §§ 4:3, 4:11.
107. Professor Richard A. Nagareda, Complex Litigation Lecture, Vanderbilt University Law
School (Spring 2010).
108. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) (providing that a class action may be maintained when
separate actions could result in a determination which "as a practical matter, would be
dispositive of the interests of the other [class] members . . . or would substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests"). Examples of this type of class action provided by
the Advisory Committee Notes include: "an action by policy holders against a fraternal benefit
association attacking a financial reorganization of the society"; "an action by shareholders to
compel the declaration of a dividend"; and "an action by a creditor to set aside a fraudulent
conveyance.., when the debtor's assets are insufficient to pay all creditors' claims." FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(b)(1)(B) advisory committee's note. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), for a
fuller explanation of the limited fund doctrine generally.
109. NEWBERG, supra note 87, §§ 4:4, 4:11.
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order the defendant to stop doing X, while other courts may rule that
X is not illegal. Rules 23(b)(1)(A) and 23(b)(2) gather these claims
together, so that the court only issues one ruling for relief common to
the class as a whole. 110
Rule 23(b)(3), by contrast, provides for an opt-out provision and
is usually sought in the case of damage claims, where the plaintiffs
are not already "tied together."'' Plaintiffs seeking a Rule 23(b)(3)
class must show that common issues predominate over individualized
issues and that the class mechanism is a superior mode of litigation." 2
In securities fraud cases, which are uniformly certified under Rule
23(b)(3),113 the "predominance" requirement prevents certification in
the absence of the fraud-on-the-market presumption because
individualized reliance issues would pervade the litigation. 114 Under
this reasoning, class certification would neither be "efficient" nor
"superior" because of the need for mini-trials to determine the reliance
of each plaintiff in a class of thousands. The fraud-on-the-market
presumption shifts this burden, making it such that the common
issues predominate over the issue of reliance, which no longer
presents an individualized inquiry." 5
ERISA stock-drop claims under section 502(a)(2) have been
certified under several sections of Rule 23(b), further complicating the
reliance analysis. Many courts certify ERISA section 502(a)(2) claims
under 23(b)(1)(B), for example, because of the derivative nature of
these claims on behalf of the plan. 16 Given ERISA's grounding in the
equitable principles of trust law, several courts have found that claims
under section 502(a)(2) are analogous to "restor[ing] the subject of a
trust" for losses." 7 They find that the resolution of the case could be
dispositive for other plan participants because of the unified nature of
110. Id.
111. See id. § 4:21.
112. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
113. 4 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES
FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD § 7:462 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing the relationship of Rule 10b-5
to the class-action device).
114. Id. § 7:457 (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 589 F.3d 585, 604 (3d Cir. 2009) ("In
light of the derivative nature of ERISA [section] 502(a)(2) claims, breach of fiduciary duty claims
brought under [section] 502(a)(2) are paradigmatic examples of claims appropriate for
certification as a Rule 23(b)(1) class, as numerous courts have held."); Hochstadt v. Boston Sci.
Corp., No. 08-12139-DPW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41007, at *27-30 (D. Mass. Apr. 27, 2010)
(same).
117. Schering Plough, 589 F.3d at 604; Hochstadt, No. 08-12139-DPW, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 41007, at *27-30.
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"the plan" and that multiple cases would subject the fiduciaries to
different standards. 118
By contrast, some courts refuse to certify ERISA stock-drop
classes under Rule 23(b)(2) on the grounds that LaRue, which allowed
individual account holders to bring separate suits for recovery,
complicates the Rule 23(b) analysis.1 9 ERISA plaintiffs are, in
essence, seeking monetary relief for losses to their individual
accounts, which will be returned to them through recovery to the
plan. 120 "The very fact that participants may sue to recover the losses
to their individual accounts takes these cases out of the traditional
realm of Rule 23(b)(1)(B)."'121 Under LaRue, individual account holders
may bring separate suits having a similar purpose and effect to the
10b-5 damage claims: monetary recovery for losses caused by the
fiduciary breach, inuring to the individual plan participant's account.
Whether ERISA stock-drop cases ought to be certified under
Rule 23(b)(1), (b)(2) or (b)(3) need not be decided now to resolve the
problem at hand. Either way, the issue of detrimental reliance
remains central to the certification decision. Courts that would certify
ERISA section 502(a)(2) claims under 23(b)(3) must analyze
individualized reliance as part of the predominance requirement,
22
118. Schering Plough, 589 F.3d at 604; Hochstadt, No. 08-12139-DPW, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 41007, at *27-30.
119. See, e.g., In re Fremont Gen. Corp. Litig., No. 2:07-cv-02693-JHN-FFMx, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 85175 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2010), at *12-20 ("Because [under LaRue] usual
preclusion rules would not appear to adversely affect an individual's ability to bring his or her
own claims in the event that another individual's claim is defeated, class certification under Rule
23(b)(1)(B) is unnecessary to protect the interests of unnamed class members."); In re First Am.
Corp. ERISA Litig., 258 F.R.D. 610, 621-22 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that neither certification
under 23(b)(1)(A) nor under 23(b)(1)(B) was appropriate for claims under ERISA section
502(a)(2) because of the Supreme Court's decision in LaRue); In re Computer Scis. Corp. ERISA
Litig., No. CV 08-02398 SJO (JWJx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109027, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2,
2008) (finding certification under 23(h)(1)(B) to be inappropriate in light of LaRue).
120. First Am. Corp., 258 F.R.D. at 622 ("Here, the Plan Participants primarily seek
monetary damages; damages to the Plan, and demands that the First American Defendants
make the Plan whole, are the primary focus of this action.").
121. Mark A. Perry & Paul Blankenstein, The Inapplicability of Rule 23(b)(1) to ERISA Class
Actions, 6 Workplace L. Rep. (BNA) 1571, 1575 (Dec. 5, 2008), available at http://www.
gibsondunn.comlpublications/Documents/Perry-Blankenship-ERISAClassActions.pdf ("LaRue
confirms that most claims for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, brought by participants in
401(k) and other defined contribution plans seeking monetary relief, cannot be certified as
mandatory class actions under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). Rather, such claimants must satisfy the more
rigorous requirements, and the more robust protections, of Rule 23(b)(3) before their claims can
proceed on a class basis.").
122. See In re Elec. Data Sys. ERISA Litig., 224 F.R.D. 613, 629-30 (E.D. Tex. 2004)
(refusing to certify an ERISA section 502(a)(2) claim under Rule 23(b)(3) because of
individualized issues of reliance).
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and even the courts that use Rule 23(b)(1) will consider reliance
within the context of typicality.123 A solution to the problem of
detrimental reliance for ERISA section 502(a)(2) claims must
therefore consider both typicality and predominance in order to
succeed regardless of how courts resolve the Rule 23(b) divide.
III. ERISA FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND RELIANCE AT CLASS
CERTIFICATION: THE NEED FOR A "BASIC SOLUTION"
Given the representative nature of claims under ERISA section
502(a)(2) and the efficiency goals of class certification, ERISA
misrepresentation and nondisclosure claims are particularly attractive
candidates for class-wide treatment. ERISA plaintiffs are, after all,
seeking to recover losses to the same employer-sponsored benefit plan,
and are therefore asserting a shared harm. Additionally, most of the
legal and factual questions in an ERISA misrepresentation claim will
focus on the defendants' statuses as fiduciaries and whether their
behavior constituted a breach, and will therefore be common to all
class members.
In this respect, ERISA misrepresentation and nondisclosure
claims are similar to securities fraud claims under Rule 10b-5. The
majority of the 10b-5 elements also focus on the behavior of the
defendant, rendering the issues common across all plaintiffs. 124
However, as in securities fraud, the but-for causation element for
ERISA misrepresentation claims may require individual proof of
detrimental reliance. Under Rule 10b-5, this detrimental reliance
element precludes class certification absent the fraud-on-the-market
presumption because of the need for individualized proof.125
The purpose of this Part is to evaluate whether a solution
similar to the fraud-on-the-market presumption is applicable to
ERISA misrepresentation claims, allowing for class certification. The
current four-way split in ERISA case law creates two analytically
distinct questions about ERISA misrepresentation and nondisclosure
claims: (1) Does an ERISA misrepresentation claim require a showing
123. See, e.g., In re Merck & Co., MDL No. 1658, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10243, *15-21
(D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2009) (certifying the prudence claim under Rule 23(b)(1), but refusing to certify
the communication claim under any of the three subsections because of problems of
individualized reliance).
124. Steven Serajeddini, Note, Loss Causation and Class Certification, 108 MICH. L. REV.
255, 257 (2009).
125. Id. at 258; see supra Part II.B (analyzing securities fraud claims under the class
certification standard).
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of detrimental reliance, and, if so, (2) does this affect class
certification? After a more rigorous analysis of ERISA
misrepresentation and nondisclosure claims and the proof they
require, this Part examines the solutions currently used in the district
courts, and evaluates the merits of each one.
A. ERISA Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure Claims
Although the law in this area is "both controversial and
evolving,"'126 all ERISA plaintiffs must demonstrate three basic
elements in order to prevail under sections 409 and 502(a)(2).
Plaintiffs must show that the defendant, (1) acting in his fiduciary
capacity, (2) breached his fiduciary duty under section 409, and that
(3) the breach resulted in harm to the plan.
1. Fiduciary Status
Establishing that the defendants are fiduciaries under ERISA
is largely a functional analysis. Unlike in trust law, which ties the
fiduciary label to a given individual, 127 the ERISA fiduciary is defined
in time by her actions and will therefore often wear "two hats.'' 28 As
the Supreme Court explained in Pegram v. Herdrich,129 this creates an
inherent conflict of interest: "Employers, for example, can be ERISA
fiduciaries and still take actions to the disadvantage of employee
beneficiaries when they act as employers . . . or even as plan
sponsors." 130 ERISA requires, however, "that a fiduciary with two hats
wear only one at a time, and wear the fiduciary hat when making
fiduciary decisions.' 31
This "two hat" doctrine has two pertinent consequences for
ERISA misrepresentation and nondisclosure claims. First, because
securities fraud defendants are defined by their relationship to any
126. In re Cardinal Health, Inc. ERISA Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1045 (S.D. Ohio 2006).
127. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS Introductory Note (2003) (explaining that "an
executor, guardian, agent, or corporate officer or director is a fiduciary" simply by virtue of her
title).
128. Richard L. Kaplan, Nicholas J. Powers, & Jordan Zucker, Retirees at Risk: The
Precarious Promise of Post-Employment Health Benefits, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS,
287, 302 (2009).
129. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
130. Id. at 224.
131. Id. (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996)); see also ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2006) (providing a functional definition of fiduciary status).
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alleged fraudulent communications (and not to employee benefits), 132
the set of defendants in ERISA and 10b-5 causes of action will only
intersect incidentally. 133 In other words, not all communications are
made while the employer is wearing her "fiduciary hat," so the scope of
actionable communications is much narrower. 134
Accordingly, several courts have ruled that statements to the
market or corporate communications to all employees are not
actionable because they are not made in a fiduciary capacity. 135 Even
so, these "to the market" SEC filings will often be considered fiduciary
communications when incorporated by reference into the SPD or some
other plan-specific communication. 36 Because incorporation seems to
be common practice among ERISA defendants, this tends to increase
the extent to which ERISA and securities communications intersect,
even if this intersection is also incidental.
In addition, the "two hat" doctrine emphasizes the unique role
of many ERISA fiduciaries. Because ERISA fiduciaries are often
employers or corporate insiders, they will usually have information
that would be relevant to investors generally, including employees
investing in company stock through a defined-contribution plan. 37
Especially when it comes to investment in employer stock, fiduciaries
cannot be expected to forget the information that they have learned in
either role just by putting on a different hat. 38 This conflict sets the
stage for all ERISA misrepresentation claims, which are rooted in
132. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010) (specifying that any defrauding party may be liable
under Rule 10b-5); 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (creating control person liability for "[e]very person who
directly or indirectly, controls any person liable ...."); id. § 17t(e) (creating liability for an aidor
or abettor, which is "any person that knowingly provides substantial assistance to another
person in violation of a provision of this title, or of any rule or regulation issued under this title").
133. See Bravo, supra note 16, at 501.
134. Varity, 516 U.S. at 505 (finding that a fiduciary is not liable under ERISA "simply
because it made statements about its expected financial condition" or "because an ordinary
business decision turned out to have an adverse effect on the plan").
135. Davidson & Trankiem, supra note 41, at 22. But see In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA
Litig., 683 F. Supp. 2d 294, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[Pllaintiffs contend that the Director
Defendants are functional fiduciaries because they made or approved inaccurate statements in
Lehman's SEC filings, which were incorporated into the Plan documents. The flaw in this
argument, however, is that there is no basis for the assumption that the Director Defendants
acted in an ERISA fiduciary capacity when making these statements.").
136. Under ERISA section 402(a), the Summary Plan Description ("SPD") is the primary
mandatory disclosure mechanism for benefit plan fiduciaries. It requires that fiduciaries disclose
basic information, which is "sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such
participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan."
137. Beverly Cohen, Divided Loyalties: How the MetLife v. Glenn Standard Discounts
ERISA Fiduciaries' Conflicts of Interest, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 955, 956.
138. Id.
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broad principles of a fiduciary duty requiring all decisions to be made
"with an eye single to the interests of the participants and
beneficiaries."139
2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
After establishing the threshold question of fiduciary status, an
ERISA plaintiff must also show that the challenged misrepresentation
or nondisclosure constituted a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA
section 409(a). Usually, this involves a showing of both materiality
and scope-that is, that the communication or omission was both
likely to mislead the plan participants and was the type of
communication that ERISA fiduciary duties are meant to guard
against.
In general, an ERISA misrepresentation is material "if there is
a substantial likelihood that it would mislead a reasonable employee
in making an adequately informed decision."'140 As Judge Frank
Easterbrook observed in a recent opinion, the efficient markets
hypothesis defines "materiality" in ERISA stock-drop cases: because
"securities law assumes that markets for widely traded stock .. .are
efficient and impound all publicly available information," information
that does not move the stock price is necessarily not material to
investors' decisions. 14 1
After establishing materiality and fiduciary communication
status, the scope of ERISA misrepresentation claims is relatively
clear. "Lying is inconsistent with the duty of loyalty owed by all
[ERISA] fiduciaries,"' 142 and materially misleading statements specific
to the plan will always be actionable under ERISA. 143 What is less
clear is the scope of fiduciary duties underlying nondisclosure
claims. 44  Because ERISA already specifies detailed disclosure
139. Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1458 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Berlin v. Mich. Bell Tel.
Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1162 (6th Cir. 1988)); see also Stabile, supra note 10, at 397 ("Executives in
many of the companies now being sued were paid quite lavishly by their employers, and also held
a lot of company stock in their own portfolios. Thus, they had personal interest in the company
continuing to be perceived as a strong investment ... [creating] a very divided interest.").
140. Fisher v. Phila. Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1533, 1538 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting also that the
materiality of a representation is a mixed question of law and fact).
141. Nelson v. Hodowal, 512 F.3d 347, 350 (7th Cir. 2008).
142. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (quoting Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. v. Penn
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1983)).
143. Stabile, supra note 10, at 392.
144. Trevino, supra note 16, at 511 ("A more difficult duty question arises when the fiduciary
remains silent about a material fact that a reasonable plan participant would need to know to
protect his interest in the plan.").
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requirements for plan fiduciaries, some courts are reluctant to expand
the scope of these requirements. 145 Viewing ERISA's detailed
disclosure requirements as "comprehensive," the idea of expanding
them even more raises concerns about the accompanying
administrative costs. 146 Even so, the Department of Labor has
unofficially opined that the fiduciary duty of loyalty sometimes
requires disclosures not otherwise specified in ERISA. 147 In fact,
several courts have held that fiduciaries have an affirmative duty to
disclose to plan participants the circumstances that render stock an
imprudent investment, including irregular accounting practices. 48
In sum, a breach of fiduciary duty happens when a fiduciary
makes a materially misleading statement or fails to disclose certain
information. Disclosure requirements include at least those
disclosures specified by ERISA. Courts are still divided, however, as to
whether fiduciaries must disclose information in addition to the
disclosures specified by statute.
3. Causation
After establishing fiduciary status and breach of fiduciary duty,
an ERISA stock-drop plaintiff must demonstrate a causal connection
between the breach and the harm alleged. This causation element is a
side effect of the nature of defined-contribution accounts, which
include 401(k) plans and Employer Stock Ownership Plans
("ESOPs").149  Unlike defined-benefit accounts, which provide
"guaranteed benefits prefunded in accordance with actuarial
standards,"150 defined-contribution accounts are participant-
145. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 84 (1995) (explaining that
Congress did not intend to supplement ERISA's reporting and disclosure scheme "by a faraway
provision in another part of [ERISA.]").
146. See Stabile, supra note 10, at 399 ("In part, this reflects a concern with protecting an
employer's legitimate business objectives and a feeling that it is inappropriate for the court to
interfere with business decisions by requiring disclosures to participants.").
147. Amended Brief of the Secretary of Labor, Elaine L. Chao, As Amicus Curiae In Support
of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 10, Hecker v. Deere, 569 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. Apr. 4, 2008) (No. 06-C-
719-S) ("ERISA's duties of prudence and loyalty not only forbid fiduciaries from misleading plan
participants, but may, under some circumstances, also require fiduciaries to disclose information
that participants need to protect their interests, even if the disclosure is not specifically
requested or otherwise mandated in ERISA's reporting and disclosure provisions.").
148. See, e.g., In re Computer Scis. Corp. ERISA Litig., 635 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1132
(explaining the plaintiffs' cause of action for the defendants' failure to disclose "backdating and
other imprudent mismanagement").
149. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined-Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 455-
69 (2004) (outlining the differences between defined-contribution and defined benefit plans).
150. Id. at 512.
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directed. 51 Usually, these plans provide an array of securities in
which participants can invest both their own money and employer
contributions. 152 Along with more favorable tax treatment, 15 3 defined-
contribution accounts provide several advantages to employers over
defined benefit accounts, resulting in their increased popularity over
the past decade. 154 For example, defined-contribution plans are not as
heavily regulated as defined-benefit plans and are less costly to
administer. 155 Defined-contribution plans also allow for more profit
sharing, portability, and "consumer control"-all of which employers
value highly. 156
The primary consequence of an employer adopting a defined-
contribution account is clear: it shifts the ordinary risk associated
with investing away from the employer and places it with the
employee. 57 The safe harbor provision of ERISA-section 404(c)-
confirms this risk-shifting model. Under ERISA section 404(c), if a
defined-contribution plan permits each employee to direct the
investment of the funds in his own account, the plan's fiduciary bears
no liability to the employee for investments. 158 The assumption here is
that the participant is in control. Accordingly, plan participants must
be offered a broad range of investment options with varying risk and
return characteristics, be permitted to move in and out of those
options with relative frequency, and receive sufficient information
about each of the options. 159 The role of the fiduciary under the
defined-contribution paradigm is to provide prudent investment
options under modern portfolio theory and disclose all material
information. 60 Because the participants have control over which
151. Id. at 457.
152. See, e.g., In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 420 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2009)
(describing a plan where plan participants had fourteen options in their defined-contribution
account, with a cash employer contribution).
153. Id. at 233.
154. See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 255 (2008) ("Defined-
contribution plans dominate the retirement plan scene today."); see also Craig C. Martin,
Matthew J. Renaud, & Douglas A. Sondgeroth, Baby Ka-Boom! Coming Developments in ERISA
Litigation Due to Social, Demographic, and Financial Pressures from the Baby Boom Generation,
41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1037, 1040 (2008) (describing the factors giving rise to the shift to
defined-contribution plans).
155. Zelinsky, supra note 150, at 478.
156. Id. at 473.
157. Id. at 453.
158. ERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006).
159. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404C-1(d)(2)(i)(E)(4)(iii) to (vi) (2008).
160. The Department of Labor's section 404(c) regulations make clear that compliance with
the regulations shields the employer from liability for losses caused by the participants' exercise
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investments they select, the diversification requirements of section
402(a)(1) do not apply, and participants can invest one hundred
percent of their funds in their employer's securities. 161
The employee-choice side of defined-contribution accounts
produces another element for a plan participant bringing an ERISA
stock-drop claim: causation between the breach and the harm. Even
though ERISA is a remedial statute that seeks primarily to curb bad
fiduciary behavior, 162 basic principles of fairness dictate that in order
to be actionable, the bad fiduciary behavior must have actually caused
some harm to the plan. Moreover, ERISA section 409(a) provides that
when a fiduciary breaches her duties to the employee benefit plan, she
"shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the
plan resulting from each such breach .... "163 Most courts interpret
this clause as requiring plaintiffs to show both a plan loss and a causal
connection and to phrase the elements of an ERISA claim accordingly.
This causation element also controls administrative costs by limiting
fiduciary liability, while protecting the plan and plan participants
from the adverse consequences of fiduciary action. 164
In securities fraud claims under 10b-5, where plaintiffs also
"choose" their investments by purchasing securities on the open
capital markets, causation is characterized both by loss causation and
detrimental reliance. Detrimental reliance, or "transaction causation,"
is equivalent to but-for causation. 165 As the Supreme Court explained
in Basic, it "provides the requisite causal connection between a
defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiffs injury,"'166 because,
absent reliance, the same injury could have happened even without
the defendant's breach. Loss causation, on the other hand, is a form of
proximate cause-the plaintiffs must establish that it was the
revelation of the fraud to the market that in fact caused the decline in
of control over their plan accounts, but that the employer is not relieved from its duties of
prudence and loyalty. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404C-1(b)(2)(i).
161. ERISA § 402(a).
162. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 254 (2008) (quoting Mass. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 141 (1985)) ("[The crucible of congressional concern was misuse
and mismanagement of plan assets by plan administrators.").
163. ERISA § 409(a) (emphasis added).
164. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (finding that courts may consider
"Congress' desire to offer employees enhanced protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and,
on the other, its desire not to create a system that is so complex that administrative costs, or
litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering welfare benefit plan in the first
place").
165. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Brudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005).
166. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
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the stock's value. 167 This can be established though the efficient
capital markets hypothesis without reference to the plan participants'
behavior. 168
Many but not all courts have read the causation element in
ERISA as also requiring plaintiffs to show both loss causation and
detrimental reliance for misrepresentation and nondisclosure
claims. 169 The courts that require plaintiffs to show loss causation
similarly use the efficient capital markets hypothesis. For example, in
In re Computer Sciences Corp. ERISA Litigation, a district court
granted the defendants' summary judgment motion because the
plaintiffs failed to show that it was the revelation of the fraud on the
market-and not any of the other announcements that the company
made that day-that caused the company's stock to decline. 170
Detrimental reliance, or transaction causation, in the ERISA
context is also treated similarly to the corresponding element in 10b-5
claims. Courts that require a showing of detrimental reliance
specifically look to the statements of the plan participants, the
evidence that each participant considered, and the reasonableness of
relying on that evidence. Because many plaintiffs do not read plan
documents, instead gathering their information from e-mails,
newsletters, company meetings, and conversations, this element can
lead to a fact-intensive, individualized inquiry. 171 Unlike any of the
other elements under ERISA section 502(a)(2), this element looks to
the plaintiff's reaction to the defendants' actions. It can be a difficult
standard to meet.
Accordingly, in order to support an ERISA stock-drop claim
under section 502(a)(2), the plaintiffs must show that "there was a
fiduciary breach and that but for the breach, the [p]lan's assets would
have been greater."' 72 For misrepresentation and nondisclosure
claims, most of these elements can be shown without reference to the
plaintiffs, focusing instead on the fiduciary's actions. However, courts
that require a showing of transaction causation force the plaintiff to
167. Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 341.
168. See, e.g., In re Computer Scis. Corp. ERISA Litig., 635 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1139 (C.D. Cal.
2009); Davidson & Trankiem, supra note 41, at 27-28.
169. Davidson & Trankiem, supra note 41, at 22.
170. 635 F. Supp. 2d at 1139.
171. See, e.g., Brieger v. Tellabs, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 345, 354 (N.D. Il. 2007) (explaining that
information was disseminated "through 'town hall' meetings, internal blast e-mail updates, and
newsletters"); Declaration of Gary Scott Dreadin, supra note 51, at 2 ("Enron management also
used the Company's internal e-mail system to assure the employees concerning the financial
health of the company.").
172. Darnigans v. Grace Capital, Inc., 889 F.2d 1237, 1241 (2d Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).
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show that she detrimentally relied on the specific statements of the
plan fiduciary in purchasing the asset. This puts the focus on the
behavior of plan participants, thereby creating a problem for class
certification.
B. Class Certification for Securities Fraud Claims: The Basic v.
Levinson Framework
In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court addressed a
similar problem relating to class certification for securities fraud
claims under Rule 10b-5.173 The Basic Court found that Rule 10b-5
similarly required a showing of transaction causation and that
detrimental reliance "provide[d] the requisite causal connection
between a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiffs injury."174
Proof of detrimental reliance, however, is an individualized inquiry,
which precludes class certification under Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3),
requiring "that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members."1 75
Claims with individualized proof can only advance the interests of
each party individually, frustrating the purpose and economy of class
certification, which is to advance the common claims of plaintiffs
together. 176
By presuming reliance though the fraud-on-the-market theory,
the Basic Court created a "practical resolution to th[is] problem of
balancing the substantive requirement of proof of reliance in securities
cases against the procedural requisites of [Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure] 23."177 The fraud-on-the-market theory is based on the
hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market, the price
of a company's stock is determined by the available material
information regarding the company and its business. 178 Misleading
statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the
purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements. 179 Because
"common sense and probability" confirm that "it is hard to imagine
that there is ever a buyer or seller who does not rely on market
173. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
174. Id. at 243.
175. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
176. See supra Part II.B.





integrity," this theory provides the requisite causal connection to
support a securities law claim under Rule 10b-5.180
Under Basic, therefore, any showing that severs the link
between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received
(or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price,
will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance and defeat class
certification.
C. Analysis of the Existing Judicial Approaches
Even though ERISA misrepresentation claims and securities
fraud claims under 10b-5 seem to share a similar problem at the class
certification stage, the judicial approaches to certifying classes of
ERISA misrepresentation claims have been far more varied. District
courts have generally come up with four ways of addressing the
problem of individualized proof at class certification.1 8 1 These four
solutions separate the analysis into two distinct questions: (1) Does an
ERISA misrepresentation claim require a showing of individual
detrimental reliance, and, if so, (2) does this affect class certification?
By answering "no" to the first question, some courts have
avoided the class certification problem altogether and focused the
inquiry entirely on the behavior of the pension plan fiduciary.18 2 This
solution is justified both by the remedial purpose of ERISA section
409(a) and the representative nature of claims under ERISA section
502(a)(2).18 3 However, inasmuch as the solution creates an untenable
causal connection-one in which the plan relies upon the
misstatements-no court should adopt this analysis of ERISA
misrepresentation claims.
Courts that answer "yes" to both the first and the second
question recognize the necessary causal connection that detrimental
reliance provides, but also find it to be a barrier to class
180. Id. at 247 ("An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in
reliance on the integrity of that price. Because most publicly available information is reflected in
market price, an investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be
presumed for the purposes of a Rule 10-b5 action.").
181. No federal appellate court has addressed the issue of detrimental reliance in the context
of certifying classes of ERISA stock-drop plaintiffs.
182. E.g., Jones v. NovaStar Fin., Inc. 257 F.R.D. 181, 190 (W.D. Mo. 2009); In re Aquila
ERISA Litig., 237 F.R.D. 202, 208-09 (W.D. Mo. 2006).
183. See, e.g., Aquila, 237 F.R.D. at 208-09; NovaStar, 257 F.R.D at 190.
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certification.1 8 4 These courts reject the argument that reliance can be
presumed from materiality based on a lack of precedent.18 5 They fail to
consider, however, the unique posture of ERISA claims under section
502(a)(2), which allege harm to the benefit plan as a whole.
Courts that answer "no" to the first question and "yes" to the
second follow two distinct lines of reasoning. The first group of courts
applies a presumption of reliance to ERISA misrepresentation and
nondisclosure claims, which allows the class to be certified under the
same framework as securities class actions under Basic v. Levinson.
The second "solution" would be to hold that individualized proof of
reliance absent a presumption does not always defeat class
certification under Rule 23(a) and (b). While some courts have held
this impliedly, advocating what seems to be a version of the "common
evidence" theory, this solution would require a relevant distinction
between ERISA misrepresentation and 10b-5 claims, which no court
has attempted to draw thus far.
The remainder of this Part addresses each of these approaches
to answering the two questions about ERISA misrepresentation
claims. First, this Part answers "yes" to question one, arguing that
detrimental reliance is a necessary element of a misrepresentation
claim, and that this reliance must be that of the plan participants.
Second, this Section evaluates the two positions that courts answering
"no" to question two take. Rejecting both the Basic v. Levinson
framework and the "common evidence" theory, this Note reemphasizes
the problem that reliance may cause for certifying classes of ERISA
stock-drop plaintiffs, and the implications for all of the parties
involved.
1. Why Individual Detrimental Reliance Ought to Be an Element of a
Misrepresentation Claim Under ERISA § 502(a)(2)
ERISA section 409(a) provides that when a fiduciary breaches
her duty to the employee benefit plan, she "shall be personally liable
to make good to such plan any losses resulting from each such
breach."18 6 This "resulting from" language creates a causal connection,
which many courts have interpreted as but-for causation requiring a
184. See, e.g., In re Merck & Co., MDL No. 1658, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10243, at *15-21
(D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2009); In re Elec. Data Sys. Corp. ERISA Litig., 224 F.R.D. 613, 629-30 (E.D. Tex.
2004).
185. See, e.g., Merck, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10243, at *15-21; Elec. Data Sys., 224 F.R.D. at
629-30.
186. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006).
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showing of detrimental reliance. 187 Absent actual reliance, the same
loss could have occurred without "resulting from" the fiduciary's
breach. Combined with the employee-choice aspect of defined-
contribution plans, 188 requiring detrimental reliance is a sensible
interpretation of the ERISA section 502(a)(2) cause of action.
Even so, it can be difficult to prove detrimental reliance, and
some courts have therefore discarded this element. The view that
individual detrimental reliance is not an element of a
misrepresentation claim under ERISA section 502(a)(2), and is
therefore not a problem for class certification, is best explained by the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri in Jones v.
NovaStar Financial, Inc.189 In NovaStar, the defendants argued that
class certification of the misrepresentation claims was not appropriate
because these claims would require a showing of individual
detrimental reliance. 190  In holding that "Jones' claims [were]
sufficiently typical of those of the class," the NovaStar court found
that such actual, individual reliance was not an element of an ERISA
communication claim, and instead focused its inquiry on fiduciary
behavior.191
The primary motivation for the NovaStar court's decision was
that "ERISA § 502(a)(2) focuses on plans rather than individuals."'192
Citing LaRue, the court explained that an action brought by a plan
participant under section 502(a)(2) is brought in a representative
capacity on behalf of the plan. This means that the relevant injury is
that of the employee benefit plan, and "[t]hus, even assuming that
detrimental reliance must be proved, the detrimental reliance is that
of the Plan, not the individual Plan participants."'' 93
Other courts that have adopted this position rely on the
legislative history and purpose of ERISA to support their holding that
individual reliance is not an issue when communications were made
on a "plan-wide basis.' 1 94 Congress enacted ERISA, after all, to protect
"the financial integrity of the plan" and to prevent "misuse and
187. See, e.g., Darnigans v. Grace Capital, Inc., 889 F.2d 1237, 1241 (2d Cir. 1989).
188. See supra Part III.A.3 and accompanying notes.
189. 257 F.R.D. 181, 190-92 (W.D. Mo. 2009).
190. Id. at 191.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. (citing In re Aquila ERISA Litig., 237 F.R.D. 202, 208-09 (W.D. Mo. 2006)).
194. Brieger v. Tellabs, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 345, 353-54 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Shirk v. Fifth Third
Bancorp, No. 05-cv-049, 2009 WL 692124, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Jan 29, 2009); Aquila, 237 F.R.D. at
208-09.
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mismanagement by plan administrators."'195 Accordingly, if the plan
participants can show both that the integrity of the plan was
compromised and that the plan's fiduciaries acted inappropriately by
making misstatements of material fact or failing to disclose relevant
information, the activities of the participants should not matter.
Courts following this approach have erred in doing away with
detrimental reliance. The problem with attributing reliance to "the
plan" is that it does not create a sufficient causal connection between
the fiduciary breach and the harm to the plan. Thus, even though such
a rule may in fact prevent fiduciaries from making misrepresentations
and help ensure the financial integrity of employer-sponsored plans, it
is outside the statutory scope of ERISA section 409, which requires
that the harm "result[] from" such a breach.' 96
When the duty of prudence is implicated, but-for causation can
often be established without reference to the behavior of the plan
participants. This is because a prudence claim alleges that the plan
fiduciaries breached their duties to the plan by including the company
stock as an option in the plan, even though they knew it to be
unsuitable. Therefore, even though plan participants may make
individualized investment choices, the participants could not have
invested in funds that were not included as options, and they could not
have invested in the bad funds but for the breach. 197 This creates the
requisite but-for causal relationship between the fiduciary breach and
the harm to the plan without reference to the behavior of plan
participants.
However, with misrepresentation and nondisclosure claims, no
such causal analysis exists. This is because it is possible that, with or
without such a breach, the exact same injury could have resulted to
the plan so long as the "bad fund remained an option for investors.
This is why the detrimental reliance element is necessary-it creates
that causal connection between the harm and the breach, even if the
harm is to the plan.
195. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 254 (2008) (quoting Mass. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. et al. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 141, 142 n.9 (1985)).
196. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006); see also Michael C. Joyce, Note, Setting a
Standard to Rely On: ERISA Benefit Claims Where the Summary Plan Description and Plan
Document Conflict, 90 IOWA L. REv. 765, 786 (2005) (examining the reliance element of a
different ERISA cause of action and finding that "[iun short, reaching a no-reliance standard
seems more like a policy decision than statutory construction").
197. The fact that the causal chain here also requires the decision of plan participants to
invest in the "bad fund" does not affect this but-for causal connection. Fundamentally, it is
always possible to have multiple but-for causes. That does not reduce the causal force of the
initial actor.
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In Jones v. NovaStar Financial, the district court attempted to
recapture this causal connection by arguing that if the plan itself
relies on the misrepresentations, this could result in an injury to the
plan. 198 It is difficult to imagine, however, how an employee benefit
plan relies on communications, or what sort of proof the defendants
could put on to refute such a claim. 199 Even though section 502(a)(2)
creates a derivative cause of action on behalf of the employee benefit
plan, section 409 only requires that the loss be to "the plan"-it does
not leave out the plan participants entirely.200 As the District of New
Jersey explained in In Re Honeywell International ERISA Litigation:
The fact that [p]laintiffs will have to show individual reliance does not imply that they
do not seek recovery for the whole Plan: losses to the plan may have resulted from
decisions by individual participants; but that does not mean that the losses were not
individual losses to the Plan, it simply means that some of the decisionmaking for Plan
investments was conducted by the participants who contributed to it.
20 1
Plan participants, in this sense, are the causal intermediary
between the fiduciary's breach and the harm to the employee benefit
plan. And, as explained above, this causal intermediary is necessary
both under the plain text of section 409(a) and implicitly in the risk-
shifting model of the section 404(c) safe harbor. 20 2 Moreover, a causal
requirement reduces administrative costs by ensuring that fiduciaries
will only be liable for harm that they actually caused. This effect
supports the second, "conflict[ing]" purpose of ERISA, which is to
"increas[e] the number of individuals participating in retirement
plans" by encouraging plan sponsors to adopt them. A no-reliance
standard is therefore inappropriate under the clear text and purpose
of ERISA section 502(a)(2). Courts must address individual proof of
reliance when certifying classes for ERISA misrepresentation and
nondisclosure claims, and should not characterize reliance as that of
"the plan."
198. 257 F.R.D. at 191.
199. See In re Merck & Co., MDL No. 1658, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10243, at *15-21 (D.N.J.
Feb. 9, 2009) (emphasizing that communications are made to people, not plans). In coming up
with an alternative causal account in Basic, the Court noted how important it was for the
defendants to be able to refute the plaintiffs' evidence of a causal connection. In this case,
because it is unclear what evidence would be necessary to establish that "the plan" relied to its
detriment--except, perhaps, for plan-wide communication-it is equally unclear how defendants
would be able to refute this evidence.
200. ERISA §§ 409(a), 502(a)(2).
201. In re Honeywell Int'l ERISA Litig., Civ. No. 03-1214, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21585, at
*30 (D.N.J. June 14, 2004).
202. See id. (finding that the section 404(c) safe harbor provided implicit proof for the plan
participants as causal intermediaries).
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2. The Reliance Element's Effect on Certification
After determining that individual detrimental reliance is an
element of an ERISA misrepresentation claim under section 502(a)(2),
the second question to ask is whether this affects class certification. At
least six courts have held that individual reliance does affect class
certification and, finding that reliance is either a problem for
typicality under Rule 23(a)(3) or for predominance under Rule
23(b)(3), have refused to certify the class. 20 3
Several other courts, however, have found that individual
reliance is an element of an ERISA misrepresentation claim, but have
certified the class of plaintiffs anyway. Generally, these courts relied
upon two basic justifications: either there is a presumption of reliance
borrowed from Basic v. Levinson, or proving reliance requires some
common evidence. Because these justifications either draw too stark
an analogy to securities fraud claims or find differences where none
should reasonably exist, neither adequately solves the problem of
certifying classes in ERISA stock-drop claims. This Subpart analyzes
each of these positions below.
a. Retirement Security, Not Securities Fraud: Why the Basic v.
Levinson Framework Does Not Fit
Drawing from theories in securities fraud is an attractive
solution for advocates faced with problems in ERISA stock-drop
claims. The two areas of law share overlapping facts and similar legal
theories: the same securities, misstatements, defendants, harm, and
loss of value are at issue. In fact, lawyers who specialize in securities
law often litigate ERISA stock-drop claims. 20 4 Even so, the claims are
different in several important ways, and the reliance problem at class
certification for ERISA stock-drop claims cannot be solved through the
fraud-on-the-market presumption.
In ERISA misrepresentation claims, reliance is problematic
because it is necessary to form a causal nexus, but difficult to support
with aggregate proof. In Basic, the Court held that there is "more than
203. Tibble v. Edison Int'l, No. CV 07-5359 SVW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120939 (C.D. Cal.
June 30, 2009); Merck, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10243, at *15-21; In re Radioshack ERISA Litig.,
547 F. Supp. 2d 606 (N.D. Tex. 2008); In re Shering-Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 89718 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2008); Lively v. Dynegy, Inc., No. 05-cv-00063-MJR, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14794, at *55-56 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2007); In re Elec. Data Sys. ERISA Litig., 224
F.R.D. 613, 630 (E.D. Tex. 2004).




one way to demonstrate [this] causal connection" and solved the
problem of aggregate proof by presuming reliance.20 5
Applying the framework of Basic to ERISA stock-drop claims,
many courts have presumed reliance at the pleadings stage after a
12(b)(6) motion, allowing the plaintiffs to allege merely that the
"plaintiffs relied on, and are presumed to have relied on" the
defendants' material misrepresentations. 2 6 These same courts suggest
that such a rule might be appropriate going forward to class
certification, summary judgment, and trial, given the analogy to
securities fraud claims and the difficulty with proving detrimental
reliance on an individual level.20 7
The presumption also has carried over into class certification.
For example, in In re Tyco International, Ltd. Multidistrict
Litigation,208 a case that ended up settling for over seventy million
dollars, 209 the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire
recognized that reliance was troublesome for both the typicality and
predominance requirements. 210 In order to overcome the obstacles to
certification, the court held that "the fraud-on-the-market and
Affiliated Ute presumptions of reliance" applied "equally well to a
claim like [the] plaintiffs' [ERISA] misrepresentation count" and
certified the class of ERISA plaintiffs. 21' Among the reasons given by
the Tyco court was the fact that it would be overly burdensome to
require plaintiffs to prove individual reliance in the context of ERISA
stock-drop claims, which are similar to securities fraud causes of
action. 212 Moreover, the Tyco court noted that it would be "logically
impossible" to prove reliance in the case of a nondisclosure claim and
205. 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988) (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
153-54 (1972)).
206. See In re Uniphase Corp. ERISA Litig., No. 03-04743 CW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17503,
at *43 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2005) ("[Ihe participants are presumed to have relied on such
misrepresentations or omissions to their detriment."); see also In re Diebold ERISA Litig., No.
5:06 CV 0170, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42746, at *36 (N.D. Ohio May 28, 2008); In re Coca-Cola
Enters., ERISA Litig., No. 1:06-CV-0953 (TWT) 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44991 (N.D. Ga. June 19,
2007); In re AEP ERISA Litig., 327 F. Supp. 2d 812, 828 (S.D. Ohio 2004); In re Cardinal Health
ERISA Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1046 (S.D. Ohio 2006).
207. See cases cited supra note 206.
208. In re Tyco Int'l, Ltd., No. MD-02-1335-PB, 2006 WL 2349338, at *6-7 (D.N.H. Aug. 15,
2006).
209. 401(k) News Briefs: Court Gives Final OK to $70.5M Settlement Ending ERISA Stock-
drop claims Against Tyco, MANAGING 401(K) PLANS, Jan. 2010.
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that plan participants generally rely on the integrity of the given price
for the fund in their defined-contribution plan. 213
Despite the similarities between securities fraud and ERISA
claims, there are serious problems with applying the Basic framework.
Although the courts that reject the application of the fraud-on-the-
market presumption to ERISA stock-drop claims do so only on stare
decisis grounds, 214 there are more fundamental reasons for rejecting
the presumption. Namely, the nature of reliance in the context of
ERISA is fundamentally different from that of securities fraud.
Because, for the reasons discussed below, any defendant in an ERISA
misrepresentation claim would be able to rebut this fraud-on-the-
market presumption, it cannot be used to "save" class certification. 21 5
Under Basic, "[a]ny showing that severs the link between the
alleged misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by
the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be
sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance."216 Because securities
are traded on an impersonal and efficient market, most investors only
rely on the price of the security as representative of the security's
value. Any changes in material information should materially move
the market price, providing a substitute for reliance on the
information. 21 7 In other words, "[t]he market is acting as the unpaid
agent for the investor, informing him that given all of the information
available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market price."218
Putting aside the behavioral finance objections to the efficient
capital markets hypothesis, 21 9 there is good empirical evidence for this
213. Id.
214. See In re Elec. Data Sys. Corp. "ERISA" Litig., 224 F.R.D. 613, 629-30 (E.D. Tex. 2004)
(noting that in light of Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 2003), individual
assessments of whether class members knew or should have been aware of other information
minimizing the alleged misrepresentations would be required); In re Merck & Co., Nos. MDL
1658 (SRC), 05-1151 (SRC), and 05-2369 (SRC), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10243, at *15-21 (D.N.J.
Feb. 9, 2009) (noting that the case law suggested the plaintiffs would be required to show
individual reliance on the defendants' alleged misrepresentations).
215. See Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral
Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 460-66 (describing the efficient capital markets hypothesis, the
fraud on the market theory, and how "Basic v. Levinson [slolves the [piroblem of [r]eliance in
[c]lass [clertification").
216. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988).
217. Dunbar & Heller, supra note 215, at 465.
218. Basic, 485 U.S. at 244 (quoting In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex.
1980)).
219. See Dunbar & Heller, supra note 215, at 471-97 (listing some objections).
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fraud-on-the-market presumption 220 and there are also good equitable
reasons for adopting it.221 In the context of securities fraud, investors
may choose from the shares of thousands of companies, where billions
of shares are traded every day.222 This leads to an unbounded ability
to choose from thousands of different prices, finely gradated along a
continuum. In the context of this impersonal, mass market for
securities, investors are presumed to rely both on the price itself and
on the market's ability to price the security efficiently.
The only relevant difference in the context of ERISA is that the
employer stock is offered as an option through a defined-contribution
plan managed by an institutional investor. Therefore, plan
participants do not go directly to the market. 223 However, the simple
fact that the stock is offered through a defined-contribution plan
should not alone affect the force of the underlying rationale for the
reliance presumption. Assuming that the employer is a publicly traded
company, all public information will impound into the price of the
employer security, which is made available though the employee
benefit plan. 224 Because fiduciary communications are typically public
information, 225  the fiduciaries' material misrepresentations and
nondisclosures should affect the market price of the employer
securities.
220. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An
Analysis of the Fraud-On-The-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1082-83 (1990) (noting that
the evidence regarding the semi-strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis is
sufficiently persuasive such that this form of ECMH is an accepted working assumption in
financial economics research).
221. See Dunbar & Heller, supra note 215, at 523 (noting that some believe the Supreme
Court accepted the fraud-on-the-market doctrine in order to make securities class action
litigation more feasible, believing that class actions are necessary to deter fraud and ensure
efficient revelation of information to the market).
222. The New York Stock Exchange alone has nearly 2,800 listed companies. On an average
day, 1.42 billion shares valued at more than $38 billion trade on the New York Stock Exchange.
New Release, N. Y. Stock Exch., New York Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange Sign
Memorandum of Understanding (Oct. 15, 2003), http://www.nyse.com/press/
1066215618814.html.
223. Zelinsky, supra note 149, at 479-80 (describing the nature of defined-contribution
accounts).
224. The applicability of the ECMH to the price of employer stock in defined-contribution
accounts is widely accepted among the district courts. See, e.g., Benitez v. Humana, Inc., No.
3:08CV-211-H, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92323, at *29 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 30, 2009) ("[O]nce the
mistake was made ... continuing to invest in the stock could not have caused the claimed injury.
Given the efficient market hypothesis, the stock market price would have decreased whenever
the information about Humana's errors in its earnings guidance was released.").
225. See ERISA § 104(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b) (2006) (providing the procedures by which the
summary plan description and annual report should be published and made available to plan
participants and beneficiaries).
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The fact that the relevant security is employer stock, however,
being offered as an option through the employee benefit plan, renders
the Basic framework inapposite. Employee benefit plan participants
face a much different set of options and alternatives when choosing
among investments as compared to the typical open-market investor.
Because empirical research suggests that choices are context
dependent, 226 this changes the causal analysis for defined-contribution
plans, severing the link between the decision and the price.
The behavioral theorist's notion of context dependence holds
that the options presented to the decisionmaker and how those options
are presented affect the choices being made. 227 As Professor Susan
Stabile asserts, this is more than a theoretical idea.228 Numerous
empirical studies have verified the extent to which "people's
preferences are affected by the set of options under consideration." 229
Offering people additional choices influences them to choose an option
they would have declined if fewer options had been made available.
Professor Cass Sunstein gives a simple example of this effect. Whereas
most people choosing between a small ratio and a mid-sized ratio may
choose the small ratio, given a choice among a small, a mid-sized, and
a large ratio, many of those same people will choose the mid-sized
ratio. 230
Context dependence also implies that, given fewer options to
choose from, the specific details of the particular option will matter
226. Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined Contribution Plan Participants, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 71, 87 (2002) (citing Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decisionmaking, 25
J. LEGAL STUD. 287 (1996)).
227. Id. Moral philosophers and philosophers of mathematics and science have also long held
that our choices may be guided primarily by our more immediate and past sensual perceptions,
which are necessarily dependent on the context in which those perceptions arise. Hume, for
example, writes that "[t]he chief spring or actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure or
pain; and when these sensations are remov'd, both from our thought and feeling, we are, in a
great measure, incapable of... volition." DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 574 (P.H.
Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1888). In fact, Hume observed that even the principle of
causation arises within the context of our perception of "constant conjunction"-which is when
one thing is always coupled with another. See id. at 82-83. Kant likewise theorized that we
cannot know "things in themselves," but that experience is necessarily relational-a combination
of perception and pure understanding. See IMMANUEL KANT, PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE
METAPHYSICS 46-47 (Gary Hatfield ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press, rev. ed. 2004) (1783).
228. See Susan J. Stabile, Another Look at 401(k) Plan Investments In Employer Securities,
35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 539, 547 (2002) (noting empirical demonstration of this theory).
229. Id. at 547 n.34 (quoting Amos Tversky & Itamar Simonson, Context-Dependent
Preferences, 39 MGMT. SCI. 1179, 1187 (1993)).
230. Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, How Much is Investor Autonomy Worth?, 57 J.




less to the chooser. That is, the fewer the options with which the
chooser is provided, the more abstract the options appear. 2 1 For
example, given a range of integers from one through one hundred, the
chooser is more likely to select a number based on the specific value.
However, when presented with only three numbers-such as one,
thirty, and one hundred and ninety-eight-the value becomes less
important than the range to which the number belongs; the choice is
now between the low, middle, and high values, and not between
specific integers. This change in context will change the way in which
the chooser decides.
Context dependence theory applies with equal force to
decisions made by plan participants with defined-contribution
accounts. 23 2 As compared to the thousands of choices available on the
open securities market, providing for finely gradated prices along a
continuum, the average 401(k) plan provides participants with a
choice of only fourteen investment options.233 This means that the
individual price of those investment options will matter less than the
price range and the range of risk to which the options belong.
Accordingly, while plan participants may rely on the price of a
security to an extent, the reliance cannot be as robust as it is on the
open securities market because the price value simply means less. In
effect, this severs the firm connection between the information and the
"price," making the fraud-on-the-market presumption inapplicable.
Even if a 401(k) plan provided for hundreds of investment
options,234 however, further research shows that a presumption of
reliance is simply inappropriate when it comes to an employee's
decision to invest in employer stock. In 2004, professors at the
University of Chicago and the Vanguard Center for Retirement
Research studied the factors that employees typically consider when
choosing employer stock as a retirement investment.23 5 Among these
231. See Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Tversky, Context-Dependence in Legal
Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 288 (1996) (explaining options in a limited set as
subject to "compromise effects" or "contrast effects").
232. See Stabile, supra note 228, at 546-48 (explaining the findings of a study by the
Employee Benefits Research Institute, which indicate that the quality and quantity of options
available affect plan participant decisionmaking).
233. JEFFREY R. BROWN & SCOTT J. WEISBENNER, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH
RETIREMENT RESEARCH CTR., 401(K) INVESTMENT OPTIONS, PORTFOLIO CHOICE AND RETIREMENT
WEALTH 4 (2005), http://www.nber.org/programs/ag/rrc/NB05-03%BrownFinal.pdf.
234. In fact, (although it is very rare) some 401(k) plans actually do. See, e.g., Jon
Christensen, When a Smorgasbord Replaces a Diet Plate in a 401(k), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998, §
3, at 1 (giving the example American Stores Company, whose 401(k) plan offers 137 choices).
235. Shlomo Benartzi, Richard H. Thaler, Stephen P. Utkus & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law
and Economics of Company Stock in 401(k) Plans, 50 J.L. & ECON. 45 (2007).
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considerations were loyalty to the company and confidence in the
employer, but not the actual price of the security. 236 In fact, the
employees' special relationship to the employer makes them rather
unlike the typical investor making decisions on the open capital
market. As Professor Stabile suggests, "[m]any employees invest
heavily in employer stock because of overconfidence in the
employer."237 Not only does investing in employer stock yield more
favorable tax treatment, but the employee also has private, subjective
information about the company and its performance, and considers
that information when choosing among the various options. 238
The Basic v. Levinson presumption, which is based on a large
and impersonal securities market "acting as the unpaid agent for the
investor," is simply inappropriate in the ERISA context where context
dependence and other considerations affect the participants' choice.
There is no Basic solution for detrimental reliance when certifying
plaintiffs with ERISA stock-drop claims.
b. Retirement Security as Securities Law: Why Common Evidence is
Insufficient
Without the framework of Basic v. Levinson, other district
courts still recognize a detrimental reliance element but certify the
class of ERISA plaintiffs anyway. These courts seem to be doing so
implicitly through a common evidence theory of proving detrimental
reliance, which holds that certification is appropriate where the
circumstantial evidence that can be used to show reliance is common
to the class as a whole. 239
For example, in Spano v. Boeing Company, the Southern
District of Illinois found that "[c]ourts deciding similar questions
regarding omissions and misrepresentations under ERISA section
502(a)(2) claims have concluded that if alleged misrepresentations
were made to class members in general, on a plan-wide basis (rather
than individually or personally), then . . . class certification is
appropriate."240 The implication here is that, under both the typicality
and predominance analyses, the evidence showing the named
236. Id. at 56; see also Stabile, supra note 228, at 547-52.
237. Stabile, supra note 228, at 548.
238. Benartzi et al., supra note 235, at 50-52; see also Stabile, supra note 226, at 80-86.
239. See Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that while each
plaintiff must prove his own reliance, class action certification is still appropriate because the
circumstantial evidence that can be used to show reliance is common to the whole class).
240. No. 06-cv-743-DRH, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74924, at *19 (Sept. 29, 2008).
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plaintiffs' reliance would support the claims of the class as a whole.
This analysis is particularly attractive given that alleged ERISA
misrepresentations often appear in company-wide e-mails, meetings,
newsletters, and plan documents. Plaintiffs can claim that this
collective evidence is all that is necessary to draw an inference of
reasonable reliance, even though the standard is also subjective.
The problem with this version of a common evidence theory,
however, is that it neglects an important aspect of the detrimental
reliance equation: participants' reaction to the common evidence.
Fraud-on-the-market 10b-5 claims likewise involve the similar
common evidence of press releases, newspaper articles, and SEC
disclosures, but the classes will not be certified absent the fraud-on-
the-market presumption. It is not clear why there should be an
exception for ERISA stock-drop cases, in which the reasons for
investing tend to be more varied.
Empirical evidence of plan participants' investing behavior also
shows that participants choose employer stock for a myriad of reasons,
and not always because of the stock's disclosed profitability.241
Company loyalty, overconfidence, private information, and strong tax
incentives complicate the analysis for detrimental reliance, making a
common evidence theory untenable.
3. The Implications: Where Do We Go From Here?
The previous Subparts analyzed two analytically distinct
questions about ERISA misrepresentation and nondisclosure claims
under sections 409(a) and 502(a)(2): (1) Does an ERISA
misrepresentation claim require a showing of detrimental reliance,
and, if so, (2) does this affect class certification?
For both ERISA and securities fraud claims, the first answer is
''yes": the need for a causal nexus makes detrimental reliance
necessary to establish transaction causation for each claim. Securities
fraud, however, has a well-established solution to this element's effect
on class certification. The Basic Court's alternative causal account
though the fraud-on-the-market theory has effectively "saved"
securities fraud class action litigation. Because class certification is an
important tool for deterrence and access to the courts, several scholars
note that it was important for the Court to preserve the certification
vehicle. Some scholars reason that this might have weighed heavily in
241. See supra notes 228-40 and accompanying text.
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the Court's decision, explaining the "quickest known adoption by the
Supreme Court of a new economic principle."242
The goals of ERISA section 502(a)(2) are likewise aligned with
the advantages of class action litigation, but the courts have not been
able to "save" the ERISA device. Section 502(a)(2), like the class action
device, is meant to encourage private enforcement of a congressional
regulatory scheme and compensate the plan participants for their
losses. While these losses can be large, individual litigation incentives
are quite small, especially in the employee-employer context.
The current case law does not provide an adequate way of
dealing with this certification problem. This is because ERISA stock-
drop litigation is both too different from securities fraud to import
Basic v. Levinson and too similar to create a new common evidence
theory based on communications "to the plan." Because plan
participants invest in company stock for a variety of reasons and with
different goals, presuming or generalizing reliance is untenable under
the current models of evaluating ERISA stock-drop claims. 243
Part V proposes a new model for certifying ERISA stock-drop
claims based on the analysis of causation discussed above. Because
ERISA relief under section 502(a)(2) is a two-step process through the
plan, only limited reliance is necessary to prove actual causation.
IV. IT'S ALL PART OF "THE PLAN": OVERALL RELIANCE UNDER A
RIGOROUS ANALYSIS
In order to preserve the class action device for ERISA cases,
courts ought to assume that a showing that merely some beneficiaries
of a defined-contribution plan relied detrimentally on employer
242. Dunbar & Heller, supra note 215, at 457.
243. A final, alternative solution would simply be to allow for class certification under the
"certify now, ask questions later" standard of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974),
as adopted by some circuits in the context of RICO claims. See, e.g., Loeb Indus., Inc. v.
Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469, 480 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that Eisen indicates a court should
not refuse to certify a class on the ground that it thinks the class will eventually lose on the
merits). This solution would be justified under the theory that merits determinations are
inappropriate at the class certification stage, and that the Rule 23 standards are liberal given its
efficiency goals. With the settlement pressure and importance associated with class certification,
however, especially in the context of ERISA stock-drop actions, certifying now and asking
questions later is a risky and high stakes endeavor. As the Supreme Court explained in General
Telephone Company of the Southwest v. Falcon, "it may be necessary for a court to probe behind
the pleadings before coming to rest on the class certification question." 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982).
"[A]ctual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains . . . indispensable," and a court




information satisfies the relevant commonality and typicality
requirements for reliance as a class. While ERISA misrepresentation
claims might be similar to Rule 10b-5 claims, courts are right to assert
that "the plan" makes them different. The causal nexus contemplated
in section 502(a)(2) is between the fiduciary's breach and the harm to
the employee benefit plan. Because plan participants act merely as
causal intermediaries, only some reliance is necessary to establish
liability.
A. LaRue Revisited: What It Means to Seek Relief on Behalf of "the
Plan"
The Supreme Court's decision in LaRue v. DeWolf, Boberg, &
Associates creates a unique model for ERISA stock-drop recovery. On
the one hand, LaRue did not disturb the traditional notion that ERISA
section 502(a)(2) claims are derivative suits on behalf of the employee
benefit plan.244 ERISA section 502(a)(2) "authorizes the Secretary of
Labor as well as plan participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries to
bring actions on behalf of a plan. '245 Section 502(a)(2), therefore, "does
not provide a remedy for individual injuries distinct from plan
injuries," but is meant to ensure the proper management of collective
fund assets which are part of the plan as a whole. 246
Even so, the LaRue decision recognizes the importance of
individual decisionmaking and individual accounts in the context of
the "entire" benefit plan.247 Under the defined-contribution model and
the risk-shifting safe harbor of section 404(c), individual accounts
collectively constitute "plan assets. ' 248 The relief, therefore, is
simultaneously both individualized and unified: ERISA section
502(a)(2) authorizes recovery for fiduciary breaches impairing the
value of plan assets in a participant's individual account, but this
relief is on behalf of and through the plan. These individual account
losses are losses "to the plan," which means that the plan participants
assert a shared harm. 249
244. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 253 (2008).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 256.
247. See id. at 255-56 (noting that in the context of defined contribution plans section
502(a)(2) allows recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in individual
accounts).
248. Id. at 256.
249. Id. at 254-56.
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Under this model, recovery under ERISA section 502(a)(2) is a
two-step process for the plaintiffs. First, the plan as a whole is
restored for losses, and second, the losses are allocated into the
individual accounts. 250 "The allocation of plan assets for bookkeeping
purposes does not change the fact that all of the assets in the plan
remain plan assets. '251 Plan administrators in charge of allocating
these plan assets are to use a suitable formula to provide individual
recovery after relief is paid into the plan.252
In determining liability under ERISA section 502(a)(2), this
means that the plaintiffs' claims will focus on the first step of
recovery, as the injury that they assert is the injury to the plan. In the
causation analysis discussed in Part III above, the plan participants'
reliance serves as a causal intermediary between the defendant's
breach and the plan's injury-if there were no actual reliance in a
misrepresentation claim, the breach could have occurred without any
injury to the plan. Reliance is necessary to establish but-for causation.
In contrast, individual plaintiffs asserting a Rule 10b-5 claim
are not asserting the harm of any unified intermediary or seeking
relief through a plan. This means that in Rule 10b-5 litigation, there is
only one step for recovery: recovery to the individual. Establishing
liability means establishing harm to each account. In the causation
analysis for Rule 10b-5, it is necessary to establish the reliance of each
and every individual class member in order to establish liability as a
whole.
Comparing these two models side by side, we see that the plan
participants collectively in an ERISA section 502(a)(2) claim can be
likened to a single plaintiff asserting a claim under Rule 10b-5. All of
the plan participants might not rely on the fiduciary's misstatements,
but as long as some participants rely there will be actual causation.
This is similar to a single 10b-5 plaintiff, for example, who
detrimentally relies in part on the corporate officer's misstatements,
in part on her own intuition, and in part on the recommendations of a
friend. As long as the plaintiff in this 10b-5 case can demonstrate the
detrimental reliance on the material misstatements, her reliance on
the other aspects of the security should not matter. Therefore, to
250. See Tullis v. UMB Bank, 515 F.3d 673, 680 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that any assets
recovered from the defendant under section 502(a)(2) "would first be paid into the plan[] then
allocated to [the plaintiffs] individual accounts").
251. LaRue, 552 U.S. at 262 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
252. Id.; see also Tullis, 515 F.3d at 680 ("[Any assets recovered from the defendant would
first be paid into the plans then allocated to [plaintiffs] individual accounts, and ultimately paid
to [plaintiffs] in the form of benefits.").
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establish liability in an ERISA section 502(a)(2) claim, all that the
plaintiffs must show is that some of the plan participants relied on the
material misstatements. Only some reliance will be enough to cause
harm to the plan as a whole.
B. Benefits of the Two-Step Recovery Model Under LaRue
The "some reliance" causation requirement and two-step model
for recovery under ERISA section 502(a)(2) solves several problems for
ERISA stock-drop claimants. First, unlike the NovaStar court's "plan
reliance" requirement, it recognizes the plan participants as causal
intermediaries, and creates an actual causal connection between the
breach and the harm. Even though some plan participants who did not
actually rely on the defendants' misstatements might receive a
"windfall" recovery to their individual accounts, this windfall is not
significant because the plan participants are not asserting their own
harm in a derivative suit.
Second, the "some reliance" model better fulfills the two
congressional purposes for enacting ERISA section 502(a)(2). Unlike
the no-reliance standard or the general common evidence theory,
having to show the actual detrimental reliance of at least the lead
plaintiffs puts a burden on the plaintiffs that the defendants can more
easily refute. This makes it easier for plan administrators to defend
against these claims, reducing administrative costs and encouraging
the existence of employee benefit plans overall. Combined with the
requirement that the lead plaintiffs reliance must be reasonable, this
puts a fair burden on the plaintiffs, for whom it would be nearly
impossible to demonstrate the reliance of every participant, promoting
the equitable goal of section 502(a)(2).
Third, the "some reliance" standard solves the problem of class
certification, both under the typicality analysis of Rule 23(a)(3) and
the predominance analysis of Rule 23(b)(3). Under Rule 23(a)(3), the
claims of the named plaintiff would necessarily be typical of that of
the absent class members because all of the class members have a
unified interest in establishing the causal connection between the
breach and the harm to the plan. Recall that under the traditional
model of individual reliance, proving the lead plaintiff's detrimental
reliance does nothing to advance the claims of the class as a whole
because it only relates to a showing of harm for that single lead
plaintiff. Under the ERISA section 502(a)(2) model, however, where
the harm is the same, the lead plaintiff's reliance necessarily
advances the causation element for the class as a whole. "[A]s goes the
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claim of the named plaintiff, so go the claims of the class" for reliance
under section 502(a)(2). 253
The analysis is similar under Rule 23(b)(3). Without the need
to prove the reliance of each and every plan participant, the common
goal of showing "some reliance" will predominate over individualized
issues. Here, class members have a collective goal of proving the
breach and the harm without reference to participant behavior, and
will merely require common evidence of some actual reliance to
establish causation between the breach and the harm. As several
scholars have noted, the predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3) is
more about common proof than common questions. 254 Because "some
reliance" would establish causation for the entire class without
expanding the pool of evidence, the "some reliance" model saves class
certification even under the predominance requirement of Rule
23(b)(3), which is the strictest of all the class certification standards.
V. CONCLUSION
In ERISA stock-drop litigation, the class certification
determination is critical. Plaintiffs have little incentive to bring
individual claims, defendants may be pressured into large, aggregate
settlements, and preclusion is possible on a global, class-wide scale.
The current models for certifying ERISA misrepresentation and
nondisclosure claims do not adequately address this problem. While
some courts deny that a detrimental reliance element exists, this
analysis fails to adequately address actual causation. And while other
courts certify the class as long as the communications are "plan-wide,"
this approach fails to adequately prove detrimental reliance, which
these courts hold is a required element. Moreover, ERISA
misrepresentation claims are not the same as their Rule 10b-5
securities fraud companion claims. Because they involve employer
stock selected as an option through the plan, the fraud-on-the-market
presumption does not apply.
Courts have been correct, however, in their intuition regarding
these claims: the derivative relief under section 502(a)(2) makes them
different. Because some plaintiffs need to detrimentally rely to
establish an actual causal connection between the breach and the
253. Sprague, 133 F.3d at 399.
254. See Richard A. Nagareda, Common Answers for Class Certification, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 149, 154 (2010) ("Properly understood, class certification does not turn upon the mere
raising of common questions by way of expert submissions or any other form of evidence. Class
certification instead turns on the capacity of a unitary proceeding to yield common answers.").
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harm to the plan, these classes can be certified under Rule 23(a) and
even 23(b)(3) without worry over reliance. Despite the seemingly
shaky foundation, plaintiffs can build their ERISA claims together,
recapturing the security (and securities) that they once lost.
Lauren N. Frommet
* I am thankful for the support of my amazing husband, Adam, and for the tireless efforts
of my friends on the VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW staff. Professor Amanda Rose and R. Aaron
Chastain provided helpful comments on earlier drafts and conceptual frameworks. The late
Professor Richard Nagareda, to whom I dedicate this work, was a source of immeasurable
guidance and inspiration.
[Vol. 64:1:301348
